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I. INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, compliance with privacy requirements was a
relatively simple matter for U.S. companies. Privacy laws were,
by and large, extremely limited in scope and affected only narrow
categories of businesses. In addition, international data transfers
were not critical to many businesses, so there was no need to
consider requirements that might be imposed by European or
Asian nations. The Internet was just emerging as a consumer
technology, and spare was still a type of canned meat.1
Something is happening in the U.S. workplace, and it is depriving
American workers of their privacy rights and companies of their
international competitiveness. Workplace privacy has become a matter of
great consequence, particularly because American workers are falling
victim to e-mail spying, which is occurring without any protection against
such abuse. Electronic monitoring software sales are expected to swell
nearly five times from $139 million in 2001 to $662 million by 2006.2 A
2004 survey of employer monitoring verified that "70% of responding
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2. Robin L. Wakefield, Computer Monitoring and Surveillance: Balancing Privacy
with Security, 74 CPA J. 52 (July 1, 2004) (quoting an International Data Corporation
study).
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employers have implemented a written e-mail policy governing use and
content, 74% monitor employee outgoing and incoming e-mail, and 60%
monitor employee Internet connections."3 Nearly all computer -monitoring
software permits workplace surveillance without the employees'
knowledge, and current law imposes no duty on the part of employers to
notify employees before implementing monitoring software.
Two in three U.S. corporate workplaces have no policy requiring their
employees to manifest consent to electronic monitoring or acknowledging
their workplace monitoring activities.5  The pervasive practice of
employers monitoring e-mail or Internet usage without notice threatens the
fundamental rights of American workers. It is a widespread misconception
that "e-mail is as private and confidential as communication via the U.S.
Postal Service .... [M]ost e-mail, voice-mail and computer systems are in
fact anything but private and confidential. 6
F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby7 has been described as "The
Great American Novel," because it is the "quintessential work which
captures the mood of the 'Jazz Age."' 8 The second chapter in Fitzgerald's
novel describes an outsized billboard advertising optical services. 9 The
billboard sign, with its faceless blue eyes gazing out at the valley of ashes,
today would be symbolic of the loss of privacy in the electronic workplace.
The omniscient eyes on Dr. Eckleberg's billboard are now locked on
workers in the electronic workplace where network administrators
indiscriminately copy screen shots in real time, scan data files, read e-mail,
analyze keystroke performance, and even overwrite passwords. 10
Electronic surveillance by employers is "the merciless electronic whip that
drives the fast pace of today's workplace."" Just as the use of e-mail and
3. Reginald C. Govan & Freddie Mac, 33rd Annual Institute on Employment Law:
Workplace Privacy, 712 PLI/LIT 245, 251 (2004), available at WESTLAW, TP-ALL
Library.
4. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Electronic Monitoring: Is There Privacy in the
Workplace?, Fact Sheet #7: Workplace Privacy, Sept. 2002, at
http://www.pfivacyrights.org/fs/fs7-work.htm.
5. Survey: Most Employers Monitor E-mail, Internet Use, SACRAMENTO Bus. J., Oct.
8, 2003, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/sacramento/stories/2003/10/06/daily
20.html.
6. C. Forbes Sargent, III, Electronic Media and the Workplace: Confidentiality,
Privacy and Other Issues, 41 BOSTON BAR J. 6, 6 (May-June 1997).
7. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (Simon & Schuster 1995) (1925).
8. Catherine Lavender, F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (1925), at
http://www.library.csi.cuny.edu/dept/history/lavender/gatsby.html (last modified June 14,
2001).
9. FITZGERALD, supra note 7.
10. David Banisar & Sarah Andrews, The World of Surveillance Pt. 4: Workplace
Privacy, PRIVACY L. & POL'Y REP. 54 (2000), at http://www.worldlii.org/cgi-
worldlii/disp.pl/au/journals/PLPR/2000/54.html.
11. Robert G. Boehmer, Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees: The
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the Internet is nearly universal, so is the inevitability of an electronic
sweatshop where U.S. workers have no privacy.
1 2
Part I of this Article makes three points using an extended
hypothetical case to demonstrate that America is falling behind its
European competitors in protecting the privacy rights of workers in the
electronic workplace. The hypothetical is about a multinational
corporation's electronic surveillance policies. The U.S.-based company is
seeking counsel on how to protect its rights and avoid liabilities in
implementing a program to monitor e-mail or Internet usage of its
employees located in Europe as well as in the United States.
The first point is that a company's monitoring practices are often
justified because of the liabilities created by employees' misuse of e-mail
and the Internet. The second point is that employers enjoy what is in effect
an absolute immunity against employees' claims that monitoring violates
their privacy. The U.S. law of electronic monitoring "accords the employer
near plenary power to govern the workplace; in fact, to govern the
worker." 3 At present, U.S. employees have no meaningful constitutional,
common law, or statutory protection from employer abuse by intrusive e-
mail or Internet monitoring. While there may be compelling reasons to
monitor e-mail in both the United States and Europe, there is a divergence
in the value placed upon informational privacy. The third point is that
although European employers monitor their employees' e-mail or Internet
usage, they must take reasonable precautions to protect their employees'
privacy.
Part II continues with the hypothetical of the multinational company
implementing electronic surveillance in its U.S. and European workplaces.
The hypothetical confirms that the U.S. is lagging behind Europe in
balancing workplace monitoring against the privacy rights 
of employees. 4
This part of the Article traces the development of workplace privacy as a
fundamental right and explains how it is that European workers enjoy
Fine Line Dividing the Prudently Managed Enterprise from the Modem Sweatshop, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 739, 808 (1992) (quotation omitted).
12. The term 'electronic sweatshop,' in reference to the impact of computers, was first
conceptualized by Barbara Garson. See BARBARA GARSON, THE ELECTRONIC SWEATSHOP
(1988) (describing the ways that computers infringe upon privacy). See also Laurie Thomas
Lee, Watch Your E-mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of the
"Electronic Sweatshop," 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 139 (1994) (noting that e-mail is the
"fastest growing form of electronic communication in the workplace").
13. Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person
in Western Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y L. J. 577, 577 (2002).
14. See Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity? Electronic Monitoring in the
Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. & INT'L & COMP. L. 379, 379 (2000) ("The growth of
electronic surveillance in the workplace has been phenomenal and has created a global
problem.").
832 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:4
greater privacy in the workplace. The countries of the European Union
(E.U.) have adopted what in effect is a human rights model that arms
employees with countervailing privacy rights to challenge abusive
employer surveillance practices. 15 The result is that the U.S. and Europe
have diametrically opposed approaches to workplace privacy.
Next, we examine two parallel bodies in Europe that formulate policy
relevant to privacy and other human rights: the Council of Europe and the
European Union. These transnational institutions have played a major role
in shaping the "human rights" approach adopted for European electronic
monitoring. To illustrate the divergent approaches, the American law of
electronic monitoring is compared to developments in France, a civil law
jurisdiction, and the United Kingdom, which adheres to the common law
tradition. In these and other countries of the European community, there is
a concerted attempt to balance the employers' need to monitor with
workers' fundamental rights of privacy. Part III proposes that Congress
enact an Electronic Monitoring Act to give all U.S. workers written and
electronic notice prior to employer monitoring of electronic
communications. The proposed act would provide for consequential
damages and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees, if employers
were to engage in clandestine monitoring.
The Electronic Monitoring Act would punish and deter companies that
abuse the privilege of electronic monitoring of employee communications
and computer usage in the workplace. By adopting this reform, companies
would have, in effect, a safe harbor in cross-border communications with
their European trading partners. This proposed limited legal reform is only
the first step in preventing U.S. companies from devolving into electronic
sweatshops. Gone should be the days when American workers have no
privacy in their e-mails and Internet usage.
II. WORKPLACE PRIVACY IN THE U.S. ELECTRONIC WORKPLACE: THE
PROPERTY-BASED APPROACH,
Americans reflexively dismiss Europe as a clapped-out old
continent-a wonderful place to visit but hardly the anvil of the
future. Europeans, equally reflexively, dismiss America as the
embodiment of all the evils of modernity-a testosterone-driven
adolescent bereft of history and tradition.16
15. Gail Lasprogata et al., Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying
Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy Through A Comparative Study of Data
Privacy Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada, 2004 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 4 at T *8 (2004).
16. Old America v New Europe, ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 2003, at 32.
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The United States and Europe have clashing concepts of privacy in the
protection of personal information. 17 In general, Europe has a basic set of
legal protections not found in the United States. The first section of Part I
illustrates this great divide through the help of a hypothetical about
PhDog.com, a multinational company with operations in the United States
and Europe, as a pedagogical device for comparing and contrasting the
U.S. property-rights regime with the Europeans' human rights approach to
electronic surveillance. The property-rights approach holds that since
"employers own the work tools, they can initiate surveillance at will.'
8
The twin rationales underlying the property-rights approach are:
"[1] Employees have no reasonable expectation of privacy when using
company e-mail/Internet facilities.
[2] The employer's ownership of these work tools entitle her to monitor
their use in any way she deems fit."' 9
The first section explains the justifiable reasons employers have for
monitoring the e-mail or Internet usage of their workers. The next sections
of Part I trace the constitutional, common law, and statutory legal
frameworks governing U.S. workplace monitoring of electronic
communications.
A. The PhDog.com Hypothetical for Transnational Electronic Surveillance
You are a recent graduate from Big Eastern Law School and have
been hired as an associate in a Boston law firm known for its expertise in
advising multinational corporations. Your law firm received a call from
the corporate counsel of PhDog.com (PhDog), a multinational software
sales and services company located at 120 Tremont Street in downtown
Boston. Your law firm has been asked to advise PhDog on a number of
employment issues regarding the company's monitoring of electronic mail
and Internet usage in the U.S. and at its overseas subsidiaries in Nice,
France.
A senior partner in your firm has also asked you to research and
prepare a memorandum regarding the legal issues arising out of PhDog's
electronic surveillance of its employees in the United States and at its
17. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Hous. L. REV.
717, 718 (2001).
18. Karen Eltis, The Emerging American Approach to E-Mail Privacy in the
Workplace: Its Influence on Developing Caselaw in Canada and Israel: Should Others
Follow Suit?, 24 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 487, 499 (2003).
19. Id.
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French subsidiary. PhDog's business plan is to introduce a revolutionary
new business method throughout Europe that will allow seamless cross-
border transfers of software and other intangibles. The information-based
company has invested much of its financial and human capital into its
innovative business plan. PhDog's Chief Executive Officer, on the advice
of counsel, requires all of its employees to sign a nondisclosure and
confidentiality agreement acknowledging the confidential nature of the
business plan.
PhDog is concerned that its employees may be committing torts and
crimes while surfing and chatting online when they are supposed to be
working.20 The company has the foremost concern that its employees use
information technology to transfer business plans, product designs, and
other intangible assets. 2' To protect its business plan, proprietary
information and other trade secrets, PhDog has surreptitiously installed an
e-mail spy software product called "On the Sly," which tracks all of the e-
mail and Internet activities of its employees. On the Sly monitors all
outgoing and incoming e-mail, as well as the employees' general Internet
use. The clandestine software is configured to detect all transmissions in
multiple languages, including French and English. PhDog's corporate
counsel is concerned about a case that he read in which the Supreme Court
of France decided that employers did not have the right to read their
employees' e-mails or capture other electronic records.22
An audit of the first six months of online surveillance at PhDog has
yet to unearth evidence that company employees are misappropriating trade
secrets or other intangible assets. On the Sly's audit tracking program
reveals that one of the company's senior managers visited the website of a
popular erectile dysfunction drug and another investigated options for
assisted living. Another disconcerting audit trail revealed that a trusted
systems analyst was unveiled as an occasional user of pornography,
according to the keystroke tracking function. Another PhDog employee
was furtively using his business computer to enroll and pay for his
membership in a new age religion. A different employee was using the
office computer to participate in a web blog critical of a new age religion.24
20. See Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 290 (2002) ("It's
estimated that 'cyberslacking' is responsible for up to a 40% loss in employee productivity
and can waste up to 60% of a company's bandwidth!") (quotation omitted).
21. IDG.net, Employers Fear Litigation Over E-mail (Sept. 26, 2001), at
http://www.nua.ielsurveysl?f=VS&art_ id=905357234&rel=true.
22. Nikon France v. Onos, Cass. Soc. Arret No. 41-6410/2/01 (France 2001).
23. See Susan E. Gindin, Guide to E-Mail and the Internet in the Workplace, BNA
Corporate Practice Series, at 1 (1999) (noting that the surfing of online pornography is a
common abuse in the workplace).
24. Company employees may create potential lawsuits by sending e-mails denigrating
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Still other PhDog employees were found to have visited WebMd.com
and downloaded information on maladies such as depression, diabetes, and
hypertension. PhDog's CEO was enraged when he learned that employees
were discussing a long term relationship he had with his secretary. On the
Sly's tracking software documented that many PhDog employees
extensively play online videogames and download movies and music
during work hours.
PhDog's corporate counsel is concerned that a former employee of its
Nice branch has been mass e-mailing the company's current French
employees. The e-mails charge the company with violating French labor
laws. PhDog's computer experts have been unable to block these uninvited
e-mails because the former employee adroitly circumvents firewalls as well
as blocking software. The ex-employee has been participating with a group
of current employees in making disparaging remarks about PhDog's
business practices on the union's website.
Further, it appears that a number of other PhDog employees are
routinely surfing pornographic sites and circulating links to sexually
explicit websites around the office. PhDog's Chief Executive Officer is
considering terminating twenty employees for misusing the company's
Internet and e-mail systems. These employees are based both in Nice,
France and Boston, Massachusetts. You have been appointed as corporate
counsel for PhDog and have been asked about PhDog's rights, remedies
and potential liability regarding intrusive e-mail or Internet monitoring.
The development of new information technologies has given PhDog
enhanced access to information, but it also creates the likelihood of
widespread misuse of the Internet in the workplace. The downside is that a
company like PhDog can lose its business plans, trade secrets, and other
proprietary information at a click of the mouse. PhDog' s corporate counsel
approved the installation of On the Sly and takes the position that the
company owns the computers and pays for the Internet connections. Since
PhDog's employees have no property rights in the computers or their
contents, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy.'-
or even advocating religious ideologies. See, e.g., Curtis v. DiMaio, No. 99-7468, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 902, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2000) (affirming lower court's dismissal 
of
hostile workplace claim based primarily upon co-employees sending ethnically charged 
e-
mails). In Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1998), a company 
was sued
when a supervisor sent a co-employee hundreds of thousands of e-mails warning him of 
the
consequences of turning his back on the Islamic religion. Even though the company
prevailed in the Sattar case, the litigation was high-priced and time-consuming.
25. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications); McLaren 
v.
Microsoft, No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *12 (Tex. App. 
1999)
(holding that employees had no expectation of privacy in e-mail).
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B. The Justification for E-Mail & Internet Usage Monitoring
The PhDog.com hypothetical illustrates the critical importance of
privacy issues in the electronic workplace.26 Part I of this Article will cover
the U.S. constitutional, common law, and statutory provisions that our
young associate will need to consider. Our new law associate will need to
familiarize herself with the legitimate reasons why companies like
PhDog.com need to keep an eye on their employees' e-mail and Internet
usage. Despite the multiplicity of reasons for monitoring employee e-mail
and Internet usage, the unifying theme is that electronic surveillance is
necessary to reduce the risk of vicarious corporate liabilities for companies
like PhDog.com. 27 This section addresses the legal troubles a company like
PhDog.com will have if its employees abuse e-mail and Internet usage as
described in the hypothetical.
PhDog.com's officers must be alert to the fact that their employees' e-
mail messages tend to be more informal than formal business letters. In
contrast to a formal business letter, e-mail tends to be more incendiary and
can expose the company to potential liability. Another risk with e-mail is
that it can be forwarded easily throughout and beyond the company with
the click of the mouse. Monitoring e-mail or Internet usage is justified,
because the mishandling of these technologies is not a phantom risk. Since
the invention of the Internet, there have been a large number of lawsuits
against employees for the abuse of e-mail or the Internet, as this section
demonstrates.
Companies posit many reasons for electronic surveillance, including:
[1] preventing the misuse of bandwidth as well as the loss of employee
efficiency when employees surf the Internet; [2] ensuring that the
company's networking policies are being implemented; [3] preventing
lawsuits for discrimination, harassment or other online torts; [4] preventing
the unauthorized transfer of intellectual property and avoiding liability due
to employees making illegal copies of copyrighted materials; [5]
safeguarding company records which must be kept to comply with federal
statutes; [6] deterring the unlawful appropriation of personal information,
and potential spam or viruses; and [7] protecting company assets including
intellectual property and business plans.28
26. See generally Lee, supra note 12, at 139 ("Employee privacy is considered to be the
most significant workplace issue facing companies today.").
27. See generally Erin M. Davis, Comment, The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior: An
Application to Employers' Liability for the Computer or Internet Crimes Committed by
Their Employees, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 683 (2002) (explaining the liabilities employers
face as a result of their employees' unmonitored use of the Internet).
28. Lasprogata et al., supra note 15, at *3; see also Govan & Mac, supra note 3, at
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There is also a significant issue regarding what steps the company
should take to limit the use of computers for personal use. Here, PhDog's
corporate counsel is concerned with productivity issues as opposed to legal
liabilities. A study of Internet usage in the workplace found that "[almong
the top-ten-most-visited sites by workers during work hours in January
2000 were the eBay auction site (157 minutes); the Datek (120 minutes);
the Charles Schwab (86 minutes), E-trade (66 minutes) and Fidelity
Investments (63 minutes) investment sites; and the personal interest sites
RootsWeb (61 minutes) and MyFamily.com (58 minutes). 29
Employees can also use e-mail to solicit and harass co-workers or
transmit confidential business plans to competitors. Rogue employees can
place PhDog at risk for liability for creating a hostile work environment.
However, as PhDog licenses software and renders services, its chief
reasons for monitoring its workers are to protect its intellectual property
assets and to avoid infringing the intellectual property rights of others.
1. Reducing Hostile Workplace Claims
PhDog.com may become ensnared in expensive and prolonged
litigation because of the documented problem of its employees surfing
pornographic sites and sending links to sexual explicit websites to co-
workers. A growing number of U.S. companies monitor e-mail and
Internet communications to reduce exposure for the online torts of their
employees. Employer-provided computer systems may result in "claims of
discrimination or sexual harassment arising from ... employees' sexual,
racial, or otherwise threatening or harassing e-mails or Internet graphics or
messages, as well as for defamation, copyright infringement, fraud or other
claims related to employee misconduct."3 °
E-mail jokes, ribald screensavers, or the downloading of pornography
may also expose an employer to sexual harassment lawsuits. Sexually
charged e-mails were the basis of a harassment claim against the Chicago
Sun-Times newspaper.31 The smoking gun in the Chicago Sun-Times case
was an incendiary e-mail from a supervisor that stated: "I know I'm
getting to be a pain [in] the butt with these ride offers. And I apologize.
But I can't help myself. 32  In another case, an employee's sexual
252 (citing a study which found that twenty-two percent of employers monitored their
employees' electronic communications and activity).
29. Goven & Mac, supra note 3, at 252.
30. Mark E. Schreiber, Employer E-Mail and Internet Risks, Policy Guidelines and
Investigations, 85 MASs. L. REV. 74, 74 (2000).
31. Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1997)
(affirming dismissal of employee's Title VII claim alleging sexual harassment via e-mail).
32. Id. at 864 (alteration in original).
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harassment claim was based in part on an e-mail message from a co-
employee asking the plaintiff whether she wanted to enjoy a "horizontal
good time" together.33
2. Preventing the Loss of Intellectual Property Rights
PhDog's crown jewels are its intangible intellectual property rights,
such as new product designs, software codes, and business customer lists.
While the On the Sly audit has uncovered no direct evidence of theft of
intellectual property by employees, audit trails will document any future
unauthorized transfers. Apart from harassment claims, the greatest hazard
is the possibility that employees or former employees will use company
computers to divulge trade secrets. A spiteful ex-employee may have not
surrendered passwords or other authentication devices, giving him the
power to make files and records disappear with the push of a button.3 4 E-
mail gives computer users the means to transmit data files, pictures, and
even videos instantaneously. These illicit transfers can jeopardize the
trademarks, patents, copyrights and trade secrets critical to executing
PhDog.com's business plan.
A company that does not monitor its trade secrets may lose its most
valuable assets. Once revealed, proprietary information loses its status as a
trade secret, which is defined as any information "including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process" that
has independent economic value. 35 Electronic surveillance is a reasonable
means to maintain the secrecy of PhDog's intangible assets.
PhDog.com is not only concerned with the loss of its own intellectual
property, but seeks to avoid liability to others. A substantial risk is that the
company will be subject to unfavorable publicity, if not legal liability, from
its employees' downloading of unauthorized copies of copyrighted
software, music or entertainment on office computers. Peer-to-peer file
sharing programs allow Internet users to connect directly to one another's
computers and exchange files indiscriminately, violating copyright and
trademark rights. This type of file exchange was the subject of the famous
Napster litigation.36
File-swapping software is heedless to PhDog.com's firewalls and
allows employees to swap copyrighted software, images, and video on the
33. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1996).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming criminal
conviction of employee who conspired via e-mail to steal trade secrets from a veterinary
laboratory); James Garrity and Eoghan Casey, Internet Misuse in the Workplace: A
Lawyer's Primer, 72 FLA. B. J. 22 (Nov. 1998).
35. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (2004).
36. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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company's network with impunity. It is unclear whether the company
would be exposed to contributory copyright liability, but the publicity of
such a lawsuit would likely be negative and the expenses of litigation very
great.
In addition, PhDog.com may be liable for corporate espionage if there
is proof that an employee accessed a competitor's computer system without
authorization. PhDog.com will not normally be liable for its employees'
knowing release of a virus computer code. PhDog is not likely to be
vicariously liable for its employees' cybercrimes absent facts proving that
high-level officials ratified or acquiesced in illegal computer surveillance
of competitors. The next section examines PhDog's possible exposure to
employee lawsuits based upon constitutional, statutory and common law
theories.
C. Constitutional Protection against Workplace Monitoring
1. Federal Constitutional Developments
The framers of the U.S. Constitution could not have anticipated the
degree to which new technologies could erode the privacy of all
Americans. F. Scott Fitzgerald's metaphor of Dr. Eckleberg's omniscient
gaze symbolizes how far-reaching technologies strip workers of their
privacy through new tools and technologies.37 The U.S. Constitution did
not explicitly address privacy as a fundamental right, nor did the Founding
Fathers focus on the private sphere.38 However, the Supreme Court has
recognized a right of privacy in the decision to have and to rear a child.
39
In general, the Constitution recognizes privacy as a penumbral 
theory. 40
The right of privacy has not yet evolved to protect employees' electronic
communications. As Erwin Chemerinsky notes:
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that there is no right
to privacy granted in the United States Constitution. The Fourth
Amendment protects privacy in limiting police searches and
37. FITZGERALD, supra note 7.
38. See MADELEINE SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY 8 (2003)
("Constitutional privacy law has evolved largely from textual and inferential construction of
the Bill of Rights; in particular, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, as well as
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
39. The Court has ruled that there is a right of privacy that encompasses the right of a
woman to terminate a pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Similarly, the
government does not have the discretion to supplant parental rights to make decisions
concerning a child's education. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
40. See SCHACHTER, supra note 38, at 79 (quoting the penumbral theory of Justice
William 0. Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
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arrests, but privacy in terms of autonomy and the right to be let
alone by the government is not mentioned in the text of the
Constitution.4
To put it bluntly, PhDog's employees have no constitutional protections
against PhDog's electronic surveillance because of the doctrine of state
action.4 2 Constitutional protection does not extend to PhDog's employees
because they are in the private workplace. In the United States, private
employees have no constitutional right to privacy in the workplace because
they cannot satisfy the state action requirement.43
The seamy side of electronic surveillance is that it infringes upon the
fundamental right of employees. 44 An empirical study demonstrates that
workers who were electronically monitored manifested higher rates of
depression, anxiety, and fatigue than others in the same business that were
not monitored.45  This research confirms that the very system that is
supposed to protect the employer to ensure efficiency can actually
41. Erwin Chemerinsky, Privacy and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill the
Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 29 (2003) (citations omitted).
42. In e-mail monitoring the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the state directed or
controlled electronic surveillance in order for constitutional rights to be triggered:
Central to the understanding of privacy rights in the American workplace is the
public/private distinction. Simply put, the extent of employees' privacy rights
in the workplace depends on whether they work in the public sector or private
sector. Because constitutional rights operate primarily to protect citizens from
the government, "state action" is required before a citizen can invoke a
constitutional right. The manner in which a government employer treats its
employees is by definition state action. Because of this dichotomy, public-sector
employees enjoy far greater privacy rights than do private-sector employees. For
example, the Fourth Amendment protects all government workers from
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in
the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 828 (1998) (citations omitted). See also Kevin J.
Conlon, Privacy in the Workplace, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 285, 286 (1996) ("The Court has
been reluctant to find state action in the private sector .. "); MacDonald v. Eastern
Wyoming Mental Health Center, 941 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
"[a]bsent any showing that the state directed, controlled, or influenced this particular
personnel decision," proof that the private agency was subject to pervasive state regulation
and monitoring of its personnel standards and received substantial state funds was not
sufficient to show state action).
43. See generally John Araneo, Note, Pandora's (E-Mail) Box: E-Mail Monitoring in
the Workplace, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 339 (1996) (discussing the lack of federal
constitutional protection for individual privacy)
44. See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) (arguing that privacy is a
domain value in response to an increasingly intrusive society).
45. Peter Blackman & Barbara Franklin, Blocking Big Brother: Proposed Law Limits
Employer's Right to Snoop, N.Y.L.J.. Aug. 19, 1993, at 5.
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demoralize the electronic workplace.
U.S. employees have no constitutional remedy against private
employer monitoring, even if it is implemented in a discriminatory fashion
without notice. In contrast, employees in the public sector have some
constitutional protection against abusive monitoring because public
employers are subject to constitutional constraints, such as the right to
reasonable searches and seizures.46 Under specific factual settings, courts
have ruled that a public sector employee has an expectation of privacy in
sent or received e-mail or Internet communications.
The Fourth Amendment protects a person in the governmental
workplace only if he has proved a subjective as well as an objective
expectation of privacy in the place searched.47 In Leventhal v. Knapek,4 8 a
Department of Transportation investigation uncovered evidence of an
employee's misuse of a computer. The Second Circuit recognized that the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but concluded that the
investigatory search did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because
the employer's privacy interest was outweighed by the government's
legitimate purpose in conducting the search.49  The Fourth Amendment
does not apply to a search unless the governmental intrusion infringes on
the plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy, which is the legally
protectible interest.
The Knapek court validated the investigatory search because it was
reasonable in scope and advanced the employer's legitimate objective of
searching for evidence of employee misfeasance. ° In the United States,
courts balance privacy concerns against the employer's interest in the
public sector, but they do not apply this balancing test to the private sector
workplace. The European approach, like the U.S. public sector due process
framework, offers procedural protections against the employer's workplace
surveillance of e-mail and Internet activities, but with the difference that
Europe has procedural protections for both public and private employees.
1
46. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (finding that the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment apply to government employers).
47. The Fourth Amendment provides "[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment applies to protect privacy
where there is, both subjectively and objectively, a reasonable expectation of privacy);
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 716 (1987) (applying the Fourth Amendment to searches in public
sector workplaces).
48. 266 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2001).
49. Id. at 75.
50. Id.
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2. State Constitutional & Statutory Developments
In the United States, the right of privacy was not enumerated in the
Constitution and did not evolve until the twentieth century. States vary
significantly in the degree of constitutional protection given to privacy-
based interests. Article I, section 22 of Alaska's constitution states that
"[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed."5' Montana's constitution also recognizes a right to privacy that
potentially applies to e-mail monitoring.52 However, to date, no court has
extended state constitutional rights of privacy to e-mail monitoring or
electronic surveillance 3
Delaware enacted a statute that requires employers to give their
employees notice before monitoring their e-mail or Internet usage.54
Employers can comply with the Delaware statute by providing employees
with "an electronic notice of monitoring policies or activities" each time
they access their business computers 5 The employer can also comply with
the statute by giving a "1-time notice" to the employee in writing or in
electronic form that must be acknowledged by the employee.56 Connecticut
requires employers to give employees notice prior to e-mail or Internet
monitoring 7 New York recognizes the right of publicity, but not the other
privacy-based torts such as intrusions upon seclusion 8 New York's statute
would extend to workers whose right of publicity was infringed upon by
electronic monitoring.
In 2000, the California Senate passed the legislation that would have
required all employees to receive electronic as well as hard copies of all
employers' electronic monitoring policies.59 In addition, employees would
either sign or manifest assent electronically that they had "read, understood
and received the employer's monitoring policies and practices. 6 ° While
the proposed statute would permit employers to access personally
identifiable information of employees, an employer's "violations of the
51. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, §22.
52. Mark S. Kende, The Issues of E-Mail Privacy and Cyberspace Personal
Jurisdiction, 63 MONT. L. REV. 301 (2002).
53. Corey A. Ciocchetti, Monitoring Employee E-Mail: Efficient Workplaces vs.
Employee Privacy, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26 at 10.
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (2005).
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b)(1).
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b)(2).
57. DAVID W. QUINTO, THE LAW OF INTERNET DISPUTES § I 1.03[A] at 11-59 (2002).
58. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 50 (2005) ("A person, firm or corporation that uses for
advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his
or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.").
59. QUINTO, supra note 57, at 11-59.
60. Id. at 11-60.
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prohibition on secret monitoring would have been treated as a
misdemeanor."'" The California statute was vetoed by then-Governor Gray
Davis on the grounds that employees already understood that they could be
monitored while using business computers. 2 The vast majority of states
have no statutes or case law requiring employers to give employees notice
or any other procedural right prior to instituting electronic surveillance.
D. Tort Law Remedies for E-Spying
The current state of the law is that private employees have no
constitutional, federal statutory, or common law remedies to redress
employer abuses of e-mail or Internet monitoring. First, we will describe
the evolution of privacy law and how to classify e-mails under those laws.
Second, we will examine the relevant federal statutes and case law. The
cases will be divided into those where the company has an e-mail and
Internet usage policy and those where it does not. This distinction will
have a major impact on our comparison with Europe, as we will show in
Part II.
1. The Origin of Privacy as a Tort
Louis Brandeis and his law partner, Samuel Warren, first proposed a
new tort action for the invasion of privacy in a Harvard Law Review article
in 1890.63 The principal reason that Warren and Brandeis wrote their
article was to propose new remedies for abuses by the print media. Their
article was influential in convincing the states to recognize privacy-based
torts. 64 "It has been said that a 'right of privacy' has been recognized at
common law in 30 States plus the District of Columbia and by statute in
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
64. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), noted how New
York's privacy statute was enacted a year after Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
The New York Court of Appeals traced the theory [of the right to privacy] to the
"celebrated article of Warren and Brandeis, entitled The Right to Privacy...
The Court of Appeals, however, denied the existence of such a right at common
law but observed that "[t]he legislative body could very well interfere and
arbitrarily provide that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to
use the picture or the name of another for advertising purposes without his
consent."
Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 380-81 (quoting Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 545).
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four States., 65 The U.S. Supreme Court drew upon Warren and Brandeis in
articulating the right to privacy as "[the] right to be let alone. 6  This
newly-minted "right to be left alone" was an extension of the right to life,
or rather the right to enjoy life without the interference of outside
intervention. However, it was not until 1960 that William Prosser
formulated four different. theories to support a claim for invasion of
privacy: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of another's name
or likeness; (3) false light; and (4) publication of private facts.67 Intrusion
upon seclusion is the most relevant of the privacy-based torts to the
electronic workplace.68 In the past forty-five years, the majority of
jurisdictions have recognized these four privacy-based torts through either
statute or case law. 69 However, these privacy-based torts have yet to be
extended to punish and deter the unreasonable surveillance of employees in
the private workplace.
2. Extending Privacy-Torts to E-Mail Surveillance
In the early years of the Internet, it was unclear how e-mail should be
classified because it was a hybrid medium with attributes of several
different means of communication. The issue was whether e-mails were
functionally equivalent to the telegraph, letters, postcards, phone calls, or
radio communications. Courts have long recognized that employees have
an expectation of privacy in ordinary mail. In the 1878 case of Ex Parte
Jackson, the habeas corpus petitioner was indicted for violating the U.S.
Revenue Code after postal agents seized circulars for a lottery he sent
through the mail.7° The Jackson Court distinguished regular mail intended
to be kept free from inspection, such as letters and sealed packages, from
newspapers, pamphlets and postcards, which could be inspected or even
read by postal inspectors without being opened.7' The court noted that if
65. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 383 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 831-32 (3d
ed. 1964)).
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 & n.6 (1967).
67. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 11 (5th ed. 1984).
68. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that even if
the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, a reasonable person would not find
the interception of such communications to be intrusive).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
70. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
71. In their enforcement, a distinction is to be made between different kinds of
mail matter,-between what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as
letters, and sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to
inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter,
purposely left in a condition to be examined. Letters and sealed packages of this
kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as
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the inspector opened a closed letter, the sender's expectation of privacy
would be violated, but there was no violation in reading mail open to
view.72
One commentator contends, "Opening an employee's mail clearly
marked 'personal' invades privacy; opening mail only to ascertain if it
concerns the business would not." 3 In Vernars v. Young, a corporate
officer opened mail that was marked "personal" and addressed to an
employee. The defendant read the personal communication and then
promptly terminated the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
"fraudulently misappropriated corporate funds for his personal benefit."
75
The plaintiff was not only an officer, but a shareholder of the corporation.
The defendant owned 50% of the stock and was a principal officer of the
corporation.76 The Vernars court reasoned that private individuals had a
reasonable expectation that their personal mail, addressed to them and
marked personal, would not be opened and read by unauthorized persons,
even if the mail was delivered to the corporation's office.77 To date, no
court has extended this same logic to distinguish between personal and
business e-mail communications.
to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties
forwarding.... The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in
the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon
similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is
required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household.
Id. at 732-33.
72. No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the
postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed
packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind
must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth
amendment of the Constitution.
Id. at 733.
73. Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values and the Law, 72 CH.-
KENT. L. REv. 221, 225 (1996).
74. 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976).
75. Id. at 967.
76. Id.
77. The court found that the plaintiff had met her burden of showing evidentiary
support for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion: "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another, or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable man." Id. at 969 n.l (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652B) (1977).
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E. Stretching the ECPA to E-Mail Surveillance
In American culture, the greatest concern about invasion of privacy
has come from surveillance by the federal government rather than
monitoring in private sector workplaces where the Constitution does not
apply. In public sector employment cases, the Fourth Amendment may
apply in certain circumstances. After a controversial early ruling on
wiretapping,78 Congress enacted the Federal Communication Act of 1934
(FCA). Section 605 of the FCA prohibited unauthorized interception of
any communication and unveiling or publication of the existence, content,
substance, purpose, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication,
unless the sender had consented.79
Congress developed specific guidelines governing interceptions by
law enforcement officers in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, also know as the Federal Wiretap Act.80 The
Federal Wiretap Act applied to both federal and state officials. 81 In 1986
Congress modernized the Federal Wiretap Act and enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) to extend privacy protection
to "wire" and "oral" communications.82 However, Congress amended the
Federal Wiretap Act when it enacted the USA Patriot Act.83 The USA
Patriot Act permits federal government agents to intercept e-mail and
monitor other Internet activities.84 E-mail falls within the scope of the
ECPA so long as the information technology has a substantial nexus to
78. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that there is no Fourth
Amendment protection since the interception involved no physical intrusion on plaintiffs
property).
79. This section applied to wire communications and wiretapping, but not to bugging or
eavesdropping.
80. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (The Federal Wiretap Act or Title
III), Pub. L. No. 90-351, (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1968)).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
83. A "wire communication" under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, was "any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception" and includes any
electronic storage of such communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). However, this provision
has been superseded by the USA Patriot Act. See Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot
Act) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (Oct. 26, 2001) (striking electronic
storage of communications from the definition).
84. See USA Patriot Act § 202 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) to list crimes for which
investigators may obtain a wiretap order for wire communications). The USA Patriot Act
also amended the felony violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 to the list of predicate offenses to
warrant wiretapping. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (explaining procedures for government
interception of electronic communications to combat terrorism).
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interstate commerce. Title I of the ECPA prohibits "interception" of
electronic communications such as telephone calls and e-mail.
85 Title II
provides guidance on what constitutes unlawful access and disclosure of
communications in electronic storage, e.g., messages left on voice
machines.86 One court observed that "the intersection of these two statutes
is a complex, often convoluted, area of the law.
87  ECPA's legislative
history does support the argument that e-mail, as a form of electronic
communication, is to be given privacy protection.
88 The next part of this
section will examine how courts have construed the ECPA in the
employment context.
1. Federal Statutory Protection under the ECPA
a. Title I of ECPA - Federal Wiretap 
Statute89
The ECPA prohibits only "interceptions" of electronic
communications. 90 "Intercept" is defined as "the aural or other acquisition
of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
91 The ECPA makes it a
crime to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication.
92 Under Title
I of the Wiretap Act there are three types of activities that are prohibited:
(i) intercepting or endeavoring to intercept electronic communications, (ii)
disclosing or endeavoring to disclose intercepted information, and (iii)
using the content of intercepted information.
93 Therefore, an employer who
monitors e-mail or intercepts Internet communications has intercepted
electronic communications within the meaning 
of the ECPA.94
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The Federal Wiretap Act defines "electronic communication"
as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
[with limited exceptions] .. " 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). In the Act, Congress made no
mention of electronic storage of electronic communications. See also U.S. v. Councilman,
373 F.3d 197, 209 (1st Cir. 2004) (reasoning that Congress intended to exclude stored
communications from the scope of the Federal Wiretap Act).
86. Electronic storage includes a vast range of possible situations including any
temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof. See United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 201 (Ist
Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)).
87. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2002)
(quotation omitted).
88. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568
(stating that the term "electronic communications" also includes e-mail).
89. Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511 (2000).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
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The interception has to be intentional, which means that the person
committing the interception has to know or have reason to know that the
information has been illegally intercepted.95 Electronic communications,
including e-mails, are all communications that do not constitute wire or
oral communications.9 6  Third parties are allowed to monitor the
transactional information of the e-mail such as who the sender and recipient
are, the date and time, and the length and subject heading of the message.97
Title I only protects the content of the messages when they are under
transmission.98 This means that Title I is inapplicable to an employer's
search of an employee's stored e-mail messages.99
There are two statutory exceptions under Title I that apply to
electronic communications in the employment context. First, the ECPA
permits service providers or anyone else to intercept and disclose an
electronic communication where either the sender or recipient of the
message has effectively consented to disclosure, either explicitly or
implicitly. l00 Consent, as defined by the ECPA, also encompasses implied
consent, "which, in the case of monitoring of employees, may be achieved
when an employer gives prior notice to its employees that it will monitor e-
mail communications."' 0 ' Second, there is an "ordinary course of
business" exception, which may in certain circumstances allow employers
to monitor their employees' e-mail.1
0 2
To meet the ordinary course of business exception, the employer has
to demonstrate that: (i) the device used to intercept the electronic
communication is "a telephone or telegraphic instrument, equipment or
facility, or any component thereof," either provided or installed by the
employer, and (ii) that the device is used by the employer within the
ordinary course of the business.'0 3 However, the employer is only allowed
to intercept long enough to determine the nature of the communication. If
95. 18U.S.C.§2511(1).
96. DAVID SOLOVE & MARK ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 330 (2003).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
99. See Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy
and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 248 (1994) ("The distinction
between the terms 'intercept' and 'access'. . . is critical when a transmitted communication
is later electronically stored .... This is the case with both E-mail and voice mail messages,
both of which have a transmission phase and a storage phase. During the transmission
phase, any protection against unlawful interception ... is governed by § 2511. On arrival in
storage, the same messages are subject to § 2701.").
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
101. Frank C. Morris, Jr. & Jennifer S. Recine, The Electronic Platform: The
Implications of Technology in the Workplace, SK013 ALI/ABA 1153, 1159 (July 29,
2004).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a).
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the communication is personal, the employer must cease and desist from
intercepting the communications further.
10 4
The Sixth Circuit refused to apply the "ordinary course" exception of
the ECPA in Adams v. City of Battle Creek.'
°5 In Adams, a city police
department secretly monitored and tapped a department-supplied pager of
one of its officers. In that case, the police department had the erroneous
belief that its officer was assisting drug dealers. The court held that the
Department did not qualify for the "ordinary course of business" exception
given that the officer had no notice of the monitoring.
10 6  The court
reasoned that the ordinary course exception required that the use be (1) for
a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine, and (3) with notice.'
°7 The court
rejected the department's argument that it had a reason to monitor the pager
because of the department's general prohibition against the personal use of
these devices. The court reasoned that this was an after-the-fact
justification for intercepting the plaintiffs pager, especially where the
policy had not been enforced and the department was aware that many
officers had used pagers for personal use. The court reasoned that "[wiihat
is ordinary is apt to be known; it imports implicit notice.'
0 8 The court
found that the department did not fall under any one of the statutory
exclusions provided by the federal wiretapping laws.'
09
In Arias v. Mutual Central Alarm Services, Inc.," former employees
of an alarm services firm sought monetary damages against their employer
for intercepting telephone conversations under the 
federal wiretap statute.
1'1
The ex-employees claimed that their former employer unlawfully
intercepted private and privileged telephone conversations by recording
such conversations with a Dictaphone 9102 machine beginning in 1995.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the
employer, holding that the consent of one of the parties to a telephone
conversation was not necessary to apply the ordinary course of business
exception to the federal wiretapping provisions."
2 The Arias court also
found that the alarm company's covert interception of employee telephone
calls fell within the ordinary course of business exception.
In Arias, the secret surveillance by the employer was detected during a
period in which there was a proposed sexual harassment settlement
104. Id.
105. 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001).
106. Id. at 984.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1999)).
109. Adams, 250 F.3d at 984.
110. Nos. 96 Civ. 8447(LAK) & 96 Civ. 8448 (LAK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14414
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 11, 1998).
111. Id. at * 1; see Federal Wiretap Act (Title III), 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
112. Arias v. Mut. Cent. Alarm Serv., 202 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2000).
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between a former and a current employee. In addition, there were pending
divorce proceedings between the current employee and the owner's
granddaughter.13 The employer began to suspect that his employee was
initiating divorce proceedings against his granddaughter and having an
affair with a co-employee. During this period, the employees learned that
the company was continuously recording the telephone conversations of all
of its employees on a 24/7 basis." 4 In Arias, one of the plaintiffs overheard
officers of the company listening to recordings of telephone calls. The
court held that these calls arose in the ordinary course of business, because
the owner had a legitimate ground for his suspicion that his current
employee was disloyal.'1 5 The Arias court found that the alarm company
had legitimate business reasons to "support the continual recording of all
incoming and outgoing telephone calls."'"16 The court reasoned that the
alarm company was the repository of "extremely sensitive security
information, including information that could facilitate access to their
customers' premises.""' 7 The Arias court's definition of what was included
in the ordinary course of business exception was so broad that it even
included surveillance of conversations about personal relationships at the
company.
Courts have had little difficulty extending the Federal Wiretap Act to
e-mail and Internet communications as well as to telephone conversations.
In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,"' a pilot sued his employer charging
that the airline had viewed his secure website. The Hawaiian Airlines pilot"created and maintained a website where he posted bulletins critical of his
employer, its officers, and the incumbent union, Air Line Pilots
113. The federal appeals court described the workplace as ensnared in a web of personal
interconnections in the alarm company's workplace:
There are a series of somewhat convoluted personal relationships between the
parties, which are not directly relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. In the
course of a dispute between [sexual harassment plaintiff] and [company
officers] following her resignation in August 1995, [employer] began to suspect
that [an employee], who was involved in divorce proceedings with [the officer's
granddaughter] and was having an affair with [plaintiff], was a faithless
employee. It was during this time that [the co-employees] allegedly first
became aware that [the alarm company and its officers] had been continually
recording the telephone conversations of all its employees, including theirs.
Arias, 202 F.3d at 555 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 559.
115. The other set of phone calls conveyed a long-term affair between the former and the
current employee, but also confidential discussions with an attorney about the divorce.
These calls were seen as of personal nature and did not necessarily arise in the ordinary
course of business.
116. Arias, 202 F.3d 559.
117. Id.
118. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2002).
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Association."' 9 Other pilots employed by the airline permitted the airline's
vice president to use their log-in information to establish accounts and
passwords to log in to access the website.1
20
Later that day, the pilot received word that the Hawaiian Airlines vice
president was upset by the contents of his website.
12' The pilot then
became aware that the Airline's vice president had unauthorized access to
his site, 2' and believed that the company official "had obtained the
contents of his website and was threatening to sue [him] for defamation
based on statements contained on the website.'
'123 The district court entered
judgment against the pilot on his Federal Wiretap Act claim. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that the airline did not violate the
Wiretap Act because the pilot's website was not intercepted during
transmission, but rather while it was in electronic storage.
12 4 However, the
court found that the airline violated the Stored 
Communications Act
125
because the two pilots who shared their log-in information were not "users"
of the website at the time they authorized the airline officer to use their
names.
126
b. Title II of ECPA - Stored Communications 
Act (SCA)127
Once an e-mail is received and stored in the system it falls under the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), or Title II, regardless of how
temporary the storage.12  Title II protects stored communications from
unauthorized or exceeded authorized access, but it does not apply to the
person or entities providing the wire or electronic communications
service.129 Further, it does not apply to the user of that service or in a
119. Id. at 872.
120. Id. at 873.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 873.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 878.
125. Electronic Communications Storage (Stored Communications) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2701-2711 (2000).
126. Id. at 875.
127. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000).
128. The SCA states that it is a violation for anyone who "intentionally accesses without
authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided" 
and
"thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication
while it is in electronic storage in such system." 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). "Electronic storage"
is defined as (A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication
by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17), 2711(1).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a), (c).
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situation where the service was intended for that user. 30 This would, in
many cases, authorize employers to monitor e-mails, since employers often
provide the electronic communication service for their employees and the
service is intended to be used within the scope of employment.
In Bohach v. City of Reno, 3 ' two police officers who were the subject
of an internal investigation by the city sought an injunction to prevent
disclosure of the contents of electronic messages sent between plaintiffs,
pursuant to the ECPA. 132 The court held that the police department could
retrieve pager text messages saved on the department's computer system
without violating Title II of the ECPA or the privacy rights of the officers.
The court reasoned that the department was "'the provider' of the
electronic communications service"' and "service providers [may] do as
they wish when it comes to accessing communications in electronic
storage."' 113 The court classified stored transmissions of a paging system as
storage irrespective of whether the storage of paging messages was
classifiable as temporary, intermediate, or mere incidental "to its
impending 'electronic transmission,' or more permanent storage for backup
purposes. The Bohach court found that there was no ECPA violation
since the city government provided its personnel with the computers and
software in order to give them the ability to send or receive electronic
communications, and that the government could access or retrieve stored
communications at their discretion.
The Third Circuit reasoned similarly in legitimating the retrieval of
stored communications in Frasier v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.'35 In
Frasier, the Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of summary judgment in
favor of the insurer on his ex-agent's wrongful termination claim, his
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1).
131. 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
132. The text pager system used by the police department functions by allowing a user to
connect to a
computer terminal and ... then select[], from a list of all persons to whom
pagers have been issued, the name of the person to whom the message is to be
sent. The user then types the message and hits the 'send' key. The message is
sent to the computer system's 'Inforad Message Directory,' where it is stored in
a server file, and the user receives a message on the computer screen indicating
that the page is being processed. The computer then dials the commercial
paging company, sends the message to the company by modem, and
disconnects. The user receives a 'page sent' message on the computer screen,
andthe paging company takes over, sending the message to the recipient pager
by radio broadcast.
Id. at 1234.
133. Id. at 1236.
134. Id.
135. 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003).
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ECPA and parallel state claims, as well as his bad faith termination claim.
The Frasier court rejected these claims following the Bohach court's literal
interpretation of section 2701(c) that excepted "from Title II's protection
all searches by communications service providers.
' '136
The nature of e-mail systems makes it possible to copy a message
several times during transmission and automatically store it on an
employer's back-up system for later searches. This means that e-mails,
according to current U.S. law, are normally considered stored
communications, and employers are therefore authorized to access e-mails
under this Title. This interpretation basically makes Title I useless to
employees in protecting e-mails against prying employers.
c. The Law of Employer Surveillance Law
Justice Harlan explained that the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places, in his famous concurring opinion in Katz v. United States.
137
The basic methodology to determine what is a reasonable expectation of
privacy balances facts against interests and values. Employers' control of
their workplaces, such as searching lockers, monitoring phone calls, or
video surveillance, has traditionally been the subject of intrusion upon
seclusion claims by plaintiffs. 3 However, American courts have given
employers the right to monitor in virtually every case decided over the last
decade and have held that employees have no expectation of privacy in
their electronic communications at work. Employers have successfully
defended against common law and statutory claims by employees. Courts
have only been receptive to privacy claims in the workplace in exceptional
circumstances where the employer is prying into intensely private matters.
This section is followed by cases in which the company failed to
implement a clear-cut policy about monitoring of employees' Internet or e-
mail usage. Courts have had little difficulty finding that employees had no
expectation of privacy where their employers provided them advance
notice of monitoring, no matter how unclear, so long as the employee
consented in advance to electronic surveillance. American courts have
gone further and validated employers' right to monitor electronic
communications, even when employees have received no advance warning
about the employers' electronic surveillance.
136. Id. at 115.
137. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
138. In order to establish a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must prove:
"(1) an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiffs solitude or
seclusion or private affairs or concerns, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person." Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996).
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i. Employee Monitoring Without Notice
When companies began monitoring their employees' e-mail or
Internet usage in the early to mid-1990s, relatively few companies had
formal monitoring policies. Courts were surprisingly receptive to
employers' arguments that the employees had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in workplaces, even where the company gave the employees no
warning that they would be intercepting electronic communications. These
courts upheld e-mail spying as an acceptable employment practice and
ignored Justice Hugo Black's admonition against secret surveillance:
The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed
any more by having his property seized openly than by having it
seized privately and by stealth .... And a person can be just as
much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an
unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure
in the privacy of his office or home. 3 9
In Restuccia v. Burk Technology, Inc.,' 40 the employer had no e-mail policy
informing employees that their messages could be monitored or stored on a
backup computer, or that there were any restrictions on personal messages
except against "excessive chatting. 14' Employees were reminded to
change their passwords frequently, but were not told that the supervisors
had access to them. 42 In Restuccia, two ex-employees were terminated
after their employer read their personal e-mail messages, which he had
discovered while reviewing automatic backup-files. 43 The president of the
company had used his supervisory password to gain access to the back-up
files, where he learned that the employees had nicknames for him.' 44 He
discovered e-mails making reference to his own extramarital affair with
another company employee. 145 During one of the employees' performance
reviews, the president told him he was spending too much time using the e-
mail system. 146 Later, the president terminated the employees on the
personal grounds that they were using the system too much, without
reference to the fact that they were gossiping about his extramarital
affair.
147
139. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
140. No. 95-2125, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 367 (Mass. Super. Aug. 13, 1996).
141. Id. at *2.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *3.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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The ex-employees filed suit alleging multiple claims, including the
invasion of privacy. 48 The plaintiffs argued that they had an expectation of
privacy in these e-mails because they had personal passwords to access the
message program.149 The court found "genuine issues of material fact on
the issue of whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy" in
stored employees' e-mails and that there was a question of whether the
president's reading of e-mail messages on its back-up system "constituted
an unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with plaintiffs'
privacy."15 The court also refused to enter summary judgment in favor of
the corporate defendant on their tort-based claims for wrongful termination,
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium.1 1 The
Burk case was a plaintiff victory in that the court acknowledged the
possibility of a plaintiff receiving redress in a workplace interception case.
In every other private workplace case up to that point, the defendant had
been awarded summary judgment on claims that workplace electronic
surveillance invaded a plaintiff's right of privacy.
In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,152 the court found no expectation of privacy
when an employer intercepted private e-mails after giving all employees
notice that it was monitoring electronic communications. In Smyth, an
employer fired an employee after intercepting private e-mail messages that
made disparaging comments about the sales management. The e-mails
from the terminated employee concerned sales management and "contained
threats to 'kill the backstabbing bastards' and referred to the planned
Holiday party as the 'Jim Jones Kool-Aid affair."",153 The company had
"repeatedly assured its employees, including [the] plaintiff that all e-mail
communications would remain confidential and privileged.' ' 154 Soon after
the employer intercepted the plaintiff's e-mails, the company president
terminated his employment on the grounds that he was "transmitting what
it deemed to be inappropriate and unprofessional comments over [the
company's] e-mail system."
155
The at-will employee claimed that he was wrongfully terminated in
violation of "public policy which precludes an employer from terminating
an employee in violation of the employee's right to privacy.'' 56 The
federal court upheld the employer's termination, ruling that there was no
public policy exception since the employee had no expectation of privacy
148. Id.
149. Id. at *8.
150. Id. at *9.
151. Id. at *11.
152. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
153. Id. at 99.
154. Id. at 98.
155. Id. at 98-99 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 100.
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in the employer's e-mail system. 57  The court also rejected the ex-
employee's claim that the employer's interception of his e-mail intruded
upon his seclusion, stating that the employee could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made over the
company e-mail system. 58 The court went even further, positing that even
if the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
his e-mail communications over the company e-mail system, it would not
be a highly offensive invasion of privacy if his employer intercepted
messages on a system that it owned. 59 The court observed that the
company's interception of the employee's e-mail messages was justified
because the company had a substantial interest in preventing inappropriate
and unprofessional comments over its e-mail system, which outweighed
any privacy interests that the employees might have in their e-mail
communications.' 60
In McLaren v. Microsoft Corp.,16' an employee charged Microsoft
with invading his reasonable expectation of privacy when it accessed his
personal folders on a network that allowed storage of e-mail messages in
order to further an internal investigation of sexual harassment and
inventory shortages. 162 The plaintiff filed suit against Microsoft charging
that the company invaded his privacy by "breaking into" some or all of the
personal folders maintained on his office computer and releasing the
contents of the folders to third parties. 163 Microsoft's ex-employee claimed
that he had an expectation of privacy when Microsoft allowed him to store
a "password for his personal folders."' 64  The plaintiff in McLaren
characterized Microsoft's decrypting or otherwise "breaking in" to his
personal folders as an intentional, unjustified, and unlawful invasion of
privacy. In that case, Microsoft gained access to the plaintiff's
communications through a network password as well as a personal
password created by the plaintiff and authorized by Microsoft. The
company uncovered e-mail evidence that the plaintiff was engaging in a
systematic pattern of sexual harassment. 16  Microsoft reviewed and
disseminated electronic mail stored in a "personal folder" on the
employee's office computer. 66 The McLaren court did not recognize a
cause of action for invasion of privacy even if the employee had a special
157. Id. at 101.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103 (Tex. App. 1999).
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id.
164. Id. at*1.
165. Id. at*3.
166. Id.
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password and marked the files "personal," since the computer was the
property of the employer and only a part of the office environment. 167 The
court also stated that the e-mail messages stored in the plaintiffs personal
folder had been transmitted over the network and had become accessible to
a third party at some point. Therefore, the plaintiff had no expectation of
privacy in those files even if he marked them as private.
168
The McLaren court distinguished a private e-mail folder from a search
of a locker where there was an expectation of privacy.1 69  The court
reasoned that an employee was issued a locker with the specific purpose of
storing personal belongings, whereas the plaintiff's computer was provided
solely for employment-related reasons. 170 The court noted:
Even [if the plaintiff's practice was to move e-mail messages to
personal folders], any e-mail messages stored in McLaren's
personal folders were first transmitted over the network and were
at some point accessible by a third-party [because they were
temporarily stored in the central routing computer accessible to
the employer]. Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude
that McLaren, even by creating a personal password,
manifested-and Microsoft recognized-a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the contents of the e-mail messages such that
Microsoft was precluded from reviewing the messages. 71
The court hypothesized that even if it were to conclude that the plaintiff
had an expectation of privacy in his company's e-mail system, a reasonable
person would not find an interception of e-mail to be highly offensive, and
therefore there could be no intrusion upon seclusion.
1 72
ii. Notice-Based Electronic Monitoring
Employers have increasingly implemented e-mail and Internet usage
policies to protect their intangible assets and to reduce their exposure to
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *3.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
172. Even if we were to conclude that McLaren alleged facts in his petition which, if
found to be true, would establish some reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of his e-mail messages sent over the company e-mail system, our result
would be the same. We would nevertheless conclude that, from the facts alleged
in the petition, a reasonable person would not consider Microsoft's interception
of these communications to be a highly offensive invasion.
Id. at *5.
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litigation. An empirical study found that seventy-nine percent of
employers implemented a written e-mail policy by 2004, up slightly from
seventy-five percent in 2003.73 Employers were less vigilant in including
training modules for e-mail or Internet usage. Of those companies with an
e-mail or Internet usage policy, only fifty-four percent provided training
regarding the implications of violating the policy.174
When a company implements an e-mail or Internet policy, it virtually
eliminates any privacy-based claim by employees who are the target of
monitoring electronic communications. In Bourke v. Nissan Motor
Corp.,175 for example, the employees signed a waiver form which required
them to acknowledge their understanding that Nissan's e-mail policy was
to restrict the use of e-mail to business purposes. The Nissan court found
that the company's waiver form was fatal to the employees' claims that the
company invaded their privacy by intercepting e-mail messages which had
a salacious content. The court also held that the plaintiffs were aware that
co-workers could read their e-mails and that the company had a right, as a
system operator, to access the network.
In Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,176 two long-
time employees of the insurance company were terminated after forwarding
sexually explicit e-mails from Internet joke websites and from other third
parties. 177  One of their co-employees complained to management after
receiving a forwarded e-mail from the plaintiffs.178 John Hancock promptly
commenced an investigation of the plaintiffs' e-mail folders, as well as the
folders of those with whom the plaintiffs e-mailed on a regular basis. The
court found that the e-mail violated the insurer's e-mail policy which
prohibited "[m]essages that are defamatory, abusive, obscene, profane,
sexually oriented, threatening or racially offensive. 179
The terminated women contended that the insurer's "e-mail policy is
almost impossible to locate on Hancock's intranet system, and even harder
to decipher."' s They also argued that the reminders the insurer sent "did
173. American Management Association, 2004 Workplace E-Mail and Instant
Messaging Survey (2004), available at http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/IM_2004-
Summary.pdf; American Management Association, 2003 E-mail Rules, Policies and
Practices Survey (2003), available at http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EmailPolicies_
Practices.pdf.
174. Id.
175. No. B068705 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 1993), available at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/
fachome/chonm/Cases/bourke.html.
176. No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
177. Id. at*1.
178. Id. at*2.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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not accurately communicate its e-mail policy.''. The ex-employees
disputed the insurer's characterization of the e-mails in question as sexually
explicit or in any way in violation of the policy language. Upon review of
the e-mails in question, however, the court found that the e-mails were
sexually explicit within the meaning of defendant's e-mail policy.
Regardless, the plaintiffs asserted that Hancock led them to believe that
these personal e-mails could be kept private with the use of personal
passwords and e-mail folders.'82
The John Hancock court dismissed the plaintiff's privacy-based
actions since they had no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails
transmitted on their employer's computer system. The court relied on
Pillsbury and concluded that an employee does not have any expectation of
privacy in his work e-mail, since the expectation is lost as soon as the
employee voluntarily uses an e-mail account provided at work. Whether
the company has an e-mail policy is of no importance. Further, the court
stated that the interest of the employer to take affirmative steps against
harassment is more important than the plaintiff's privacy interest.
In Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp,'83 a federal magistrate reiterated the
conventional wisdom that employees have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in computers owned by a company. In Thygeson, an employee
with over eighteen years of service with the bank was terminated without
severance benefits for violating the company's policy regarding
inappropriate use of the Internet. The company's employment handbook
stated only that employees were not to "use U.S. Bancorp computer
resources for personal business."' 84 Another statement in the defendant's
employee handbook warned: "Do not access inappropriate Internet sites
and do not send e-mails which may be perceived as offensive, intimidating,
or hostile or that are in violation of Company policy."' 85 U.S. Bancorp
reserved the right "to monitor any employee's e-mail and computer files for
any legitimate business reason, including when there is a reasonable
suspicion that employee use of these systems violates" the company's
Internet policy.
8 6
The company estimated that the terminated employee, who had no
work-related reason to visit Internet sites, was spending more than four
hours per day visiting websites on his work computer.'87 The bank
uncovered "inappropriate e-mails containing pictures of nudity and
181. Id. at *3.
182. Id.
183. No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18863 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2004).
184. Id. at *14.
185. Id.
186. Id. at*14-15.
187. Id. at *9.
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sexually offensive jokes" saved on the company's computer system.'88 The
plaintiff was terminated and he filed claims for the invasion of privacy as
well as under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), given that he was fired without severance benefits. 8 9
He predicated this claim on the fact that other individuals misused the
computer system and were not terminated, and argued that the company
was looking for a reason to fire him for "cause.' ' 90 The court ruled that the
plaintiff's ERISA claim was barred due to his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.' 9' The court entered summary judgment against
the plaintiff on his invasion of privacy claim, ruling that he had no
expectation of privacy when the company accessed "files he stored in his
'personal' folder of U.S. Bancorp's computer network and remotely
determine[ed] the address of the websites he visited while at work."'9' The
court found the employee's personal messages saved on the company's
computer to be unprotected, just as in the McLaren case.' 93 The court
observed that if the plaintiff in McLaren had no expectation of privacy
when his employer accessed the files on its network that the plaintiff had
saved using a personal password, then this employee had no expectation of
privacy in his e-mail which he "merely labeled 'personal' without even
creating a password.',
194
The path of Internet privacy law forged by U.S. courts has a decidedly
pro-employers spin, leaving employees without meaningful remedies for
employer abuses of electronic e-mail and Internet surveillance. As we have
seen, nearly every court has held that American employees have no right of
privacy in the electronic workplace. The U.S. courts' mechanical
jurisprudence is based upon a theory of property rights, which reasons that
since business computers are the property of the employers, employers
have an unfettered right to monitor usage. The employers' unfettered right
to monitor gives employers the perverse incentive to pretextually terminate
employees to save the money from paying retirement or severance benefits.
In the John Hancock case, for example, the plaintiffs were near
retirement age and it is questionable whether forwarding e-mail jokes was
an offense so serious as to justify termination. Plaintiffs will not find relief
under the U.S. Constitution, the common law of torts, or the ECPA. At
present, workers have no means to moderate the harsh effects of abusive
workplace monitoring practices. In the next part, we explain how U.S.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *2.
190. Id. at *18.
191. Id. at*59.
192. Id. at *60.
193. Id. at *63.
194. Id. at *65.
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workers are affected by not having any meaningful remedies against
workplace monitoring by contrasting our market-driven property approach
to the well-established European tradition of regarding privacy as a
fundamental right.
III. WORKPLACE PRIVACY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: THE EUROPEAN
APPROACH
We live in a virtual world where the global transmission of
information is becoming almost seamless. The operations of
governments and corporations are profoundly transformed by the
emergence of e-government and e-commerce. Electronic
collection, use, sharing and storage of personal information is at
the hub of this transformation which modifies not only the way
organizations carry out their daily business but also, more
fundamentally, the manner by which they communicate with
citizens, consumers, clients and stakeholders.'9
Privacy in the United States does not enjoy the same exalted status as
free speech and the right to vote. In the nineteenth century factory,
"monitoring took the unsophisticated form of a supervisor walking the
assembly line and visually inspecting employee work."'1 96 Today's more
sophisticated electronic tracking of employees' Internet and e-mail use
diminishes privacy even further in the workplace. "Many fear that the new
danger of the technological workplace is the 'electronic sweatshop' where
employees are subject to constant electronic monitoring.' ' 97 While there is
no constitutional right of privacy in the private sector workplace, the law is
not settled until it is settled right.'98
195. Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Submission of the Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to the Office of the Information and Privacy
Commissioner for British Columbia, Pike & Fischer's Internet Law & Regulation 2004
ILRWeb (P&F) 2429 (Aug. 18, 2004), available at http://Intemetlaw.pf.com/fulldocl.asp?
iDoc=2&section= I &referrer=-advsearch.asp (last visited May 4, 2005).
196. Jarrod D. White, E-mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail,
48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1997) ("Despite its arduous development, the net result of this
process was a somewhat straightforward understanding by employers and employees of
their legal rights concerning privacy in the workplace. However, emerging technology at
the sunset of the twentieth century, particularly the pervasive use of electronic mail (E-mail)
by private sector companies, has unleashed new uncertainty concerning privacy rights in the
workplace.").
197. Eric M.D. Zion, Protecting the E-Marketplace of Ideas by Protecting Employers:
Immunity for Employers Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 54 FED.
COM. L.J. 493, 512 (2002).
198. It was once conventional wisdom that the Fourth Amendment was not violated
when telephone surveillance was conducted since there was no physical penetration of the
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In F. Scott Fitzgerald's famous book The Great Gatsby, the author
writes about a green mysterious light that is later symbolized as the
American dream where visionaries and explorers could hope for a better
future when first entering the ground in New England.' 99 Today that green
light could be seen as the dream about the technological revolution, and the
faith in Internet and electronic communications. The main character in The
Great Gatsby loses all hope in the end and believes that humans are unable
to move beyond the past, and that the green light as a symbol for hope has
devolved into a pursuit of wealth. 00 Now, after the first exploration of the
virtual world has been completed, we need to strike some balance in order
to keep the dream about the World Wide Web alive and not turn it into a
shallow and empty shell. Therefore, employers need to be able to monitor
their employees, like the eyes of Dr. Eckleberg, but in a less intrusive way,
with limitations on the right of employers to monitor electronic
communication systems in order to safeguard corporate assets. Employers
in America should be required to inform employees of electronic
surveillance, obtain their consent, and formulate clear e-mail and Internet
policies. Employees might once more "rage against the machine," as
during the Industrial Revolution in England, resulting in original
resistance.' ° 1  Therefore, there is a need for American employers to
recognize at least a minimum right of privacy with respect to their
employees.
Privacy has been regarded as a fundamental right throughout Europe
since the middle of the Eighteenth Century. Americans have little by way
of statutory protection for privacy outside of a few sectors, such as health
care and financial services. Europeans find the U.S. approach to privacy
too amorphous, lacking the focus or saliency of this value in its legal
system and culture.
This Part of the Article will demonstrate that the European employees
of PhDog.com have an unqualified right to be given notice of their
employer's monitoring practices, and that any use of information obtained
by electronic surveillance is illegal without such notification. If PhDog
applied the same policies in their French subsidiary as they have im-
plemented in the United States, 175 executives would face civil and
criminal liability, with the prospect of prison time and fines. In addition,
telephone booth. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Court reversed
course, ruling that the Fourth Amendment was not foreclosed by the interception of
electronic communications. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that
warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment).
199. FITZGERALD, supra note 7, chs. I & 9.
200. Id.
201. See Luddites-The Machine Breakers, Cotton Times (recounting Luddites breaking
the "Spinning Jenny" during the Industrial Revolution), available at
http://www.cottontimes.co.uk/luddo.htm (last visited May 28, 2005).
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the firm would face lawsuits by the government, as well as by employees
monitored without notice. In order to explain this great disparity between
American and European employment law, we will trace the evolution of
privacy as a human right in Europe. We first will anchor the development
of privacy as a fundamental right through a brief sketch of this legal norm's
evolution beginning with the Enlightenment and continuing through
Europe's Industrial Revolution to the post-modem period.
The European workers' right to privacy is inextricably linked with the
development of trade unions, worker self-control, and self-determination.
As a result of this history, the predominant labor law issue is consultation
with trade unions, elected employee representatives, and greater democracy
through work councils.20 2 The greater value placed on workplace privacy
by Europeans stems from Europe's history of recognizing worker self-
determination. The contrasting approaches taken in Europe and the United
States can largely be explained by the Americans' "peculiar attachment to
the notion of 'employment-at-will"' 2 3 which is the idea of "employer
sovereignty" and which diverges markedly from the European tradition.
Next, we will examine the two different administrative bodies dealing
with privacy protection as a fundamental right in Europe. First, we look at
the role of the Council of Europe in ensuring fundamental human rights,
including the right to privacy to one's life and correspondence. The
Council of Europe, based in Strasbourg, France, is a transnational political
institution created in 1949 to promote greater unity among its member
states. Today the Council seeks to protect human rights and democracy, to
foster peace among the forty-six member states, and to develop a common
response to political, social, cultural, and legal challenges .
During the past fifty-five years, the Council has evolved from an
advocate of human rights to a watchdog that also provides information and
assistance to support the original aims of the Council. The rules and the
case law developed through the Convention on Fundamental Human Rights
by the European Council form the basis for the European Union's
legislation on data protection and privacy.
205 Next, we will examine the
role of the European Union's directives as they relate to electronic
surveillance of employees in the workplace.
Directives must be implemented in each member state's national law
202. FRASIER YOUNSON, CROSS-BORDER REDUNDANCIES, GLOBAL COUNSEL LABOUR &
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 341 (2002).
203. Eltis, supra note 18, at 490-91.
204. At present, the Council of Europe is composed of forty-six member states, half of
whom are also members of the European Union. Council of Europe, About the Council of
Europe (Jan. 2005), at http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-coe/.
205. European Commission, Privacy Protection, at http:// europa.eu.int/information_
society/topics/ecomm/all-about/todays-framework/privacy-protection/index-en.htm (last
updated May 24, 2005).
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and are more specific than the American standard-based approach
discussed in Part I of this Article. The European Data Protective Directive,
for example, creates uniformity of member states' protection of privacy for
Europeans by imposing standards for processing personal information.2 °6
The European Community is in the process of drafting a new Directive
specifically aimed at a "right to protection of personal data," 207 building on
the protections already in place under the European Union Data Protection
Directive and providing greater specific protection for privacy in the
employment context.
Finally, we will examine the privacy-based legislation of the United
Kingdom and France, which has its roots in European Union developments.
We will show that a multinational company with branches in America and
Europe needs to understand both legal cultures in order to avoid criminal
and civil liability when monitoring their employees.
A. The PhDog.com Branch in Europe
Our hypothetical PhDog, presented in Part I, faces the same kind of
liability claims and concerns in France as in the United States, such as
sexual harassment claims, preventing the loss of intellectual property, and
productivity losses. However, while PhDog.com does not face any real
civil or criminal liability claims from its American employees for abusive
monitoring practices, it will be held to a heightened standard when it comes
to its French employees. This is because, contrary to American law,
French law requires employers to clearly inform employees that monitoring
will take place and to show that the employees have actual notice of such
monitoring. PhDog.com's management officers could face up to three
years in prison and/or 45,000 Euro in fines in France for e-spying on the
company's French employees.2 8
Further, PhDog.com's clandestine e-surveillance is a violation of
French employees' human rights irrespective of whether the e-mails are
206. The data protection traditions varied significantly across member states. Germany,
France, and United Kingdom had a tradition of strong protection of privacy versus non-
existent regulation in Greece. RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
187 (2002).
207. European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line, New Technology and Respect
for Privacy at the Workplace 5, available at http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/2003/07/
study/tn03O71Ols.html (last visited May 29, 2005).
208. Nikon France v. Onos, Cass. Soc. Arret No. 41-6410/2/01 (France 2001); CODE
DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L.121-8, R. 122-12 and L. 412-8 (Fr.), available at
http://lexinter.net/Legislation5/forme et langue-du-contrat de travail.htm (last visited
May 28, 2005); CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 226-15 (Fr.), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes-traduits/code-penal-textan.htm (last visited May
28, 2005).
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personal or work-related, and its officers could be haled into the European
Court of Human Rights.209 Additionally, even if PhDog were to articulate a
clear e-mail and Internet usage policy that all private correspondence is
forbidden, the French employees would still have the right to use the
network for some personal use as well as store personal files on the
computer, because the French legislation does not recognize a total ban as a
proportional measure. 21
All of this means that PhDog.com must treat its French employees
differently than it treats its American employees. Moreover, whereas its
American employees have no legally enforceable expectation of privacy in
their e-mail or Internet usage, PhDog.com's monitoring policies for its
French subsidiary's employees must be tailored to protect their privacy. In
order to be able to advise an international company like PhDog.com, it is
important to understand the reason for localizing monitoring policies. The
next section will explain how the European human rights approach was
developed and how it has evolved.
B. Protecting the Private Sphere of European Electronic Communications
When it comes to privacy, the United States and Europe have two
different cultures. The differences between the two cultures can be seen in
their different responses to homeland security. The U.S. is far more
predisposed to subordinate privacy to security than the Europeans are. In
November of 2004, a federal agency "ordered U.S. airlines to turn over
names and other data on millions of passengers to assist tests of Secure
Flight,"21' an order that raised privacy concerns in Europe. Members of the
European Parliament "warned the European Commission that unless it
announces the withdrawal of the E.U.-US passenger data transfer
agreement, ,212 the European Parliament would refer the matter to the
European Court of Justice. Travelers from Europe must now submit to
fingerprinting and photographs, and data on passenger information is
exchanged with U.S. security officials.213
The U.S. approach to online privacy has largely focused on a self-
209. ECHR, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available at
http://www.pfc.org.uk/legai/echrtext.htm.
210. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. L.122-43 (Fr.). Nikon France v. Onos,
Cass. Soc. Arret No. 41-6410/2/01 (France 2001).
211. John M. Doyle, U.S., EU to Trade Information on Sensors, MANPADS Defense,
(Nov. 24, 2004), at 4, available at LEXIS, CURNWS Library.
212. Sharon Spiterii, MEPS Give Commission Ultimatum on Data Transfer to U.S.,
EUObserver.com (Apr. 16, 2004), available at LEXIS, CURNWS Library.
213. Elizabeth Olson, Screening Program Takes Hold in the U.S., INT'L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Sept. 30, 2004, at 24.
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regulatory or market-driven approach 14 as opposed to government
enforcement. The federal government does not strictly scrutinize privacy
except in selected sectors such as health care2 5 and financial services. 1 6 In
contrast, the European member states have been enacting national privacy
laws to comply with the Data Protection Directive since October 1998.
These enactments also have profound implications for the monitoring of
Internet systems and networks. The European approach to Internet privacy
is a "command and control" model with specific rules governing the
handling of personal information, in contrast to the American approach of
general standards that are chiefly market-driven. The European Union
Directives have had an enormous impact on non-E.U. countries because we
are living in a global economy where personal data crosses borders
seamlessly. U.S. companies will be in violation of European human rights
law by conducting electronic surveillance of European workers and
transferring the results to countries like the United States that do not afford
adequate privacy protection for employees' personally identifiable
information.2"7
European countries have formulated an all-encompassing cultural and
legal response to privacy-based actions as compared to the United States,
which continues to delineate a sharp distinction between private and public
workplaces.21 8 Throughout Europe, privacy legislation applies equally well
to public or private entities that collect and handle personal information.
The protection of the individual has been a critical issue throughout Europe
for several centuries because of the historical struggle to establish workers'
rights. To understand the differences in privacy protections between
Europe and the United States, it is necessary first to study historical
antecedents of this fundamental value. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
notes well:
214. Our analysis of Federal Trade Commission cases shows that the FTC is stepping up
its enforcement of online privacy. "If a web site has a privacy policy, but its information
collection and use practices are inconsistent with that policy, the FTC has authority to
investigate and restrain the misrepresentations in the privacy policy as unfair or deceptive
trade practices. Kirk J. Nahra, What Every Insurer Needs to Know About Privacy, 5-21
MEALEY'S EMERG. INS. Disps. 16 (2000).
215. The requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA)
apply equally well to the Internet.
216. The requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act focus on privacy protection for
the individual customers of financial institutions. Nahra, supra note 214.
217. See New.Technology and Respect for Privacy at the Workplace, supra note 207.
218. The Federal Republic of Germany is emblematic of the greater protection given to
privacy in Europe. "Germany has a scheme of integrated privacy and data protection laws
at the federal and state levels, based on constitutional language and judicial decisions, that is
a model for federal systems offering protection for personal privacy." David H. Flaherty,
On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protection, 41 CASE. W. RES. L.
REV. 831, 841 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
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The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it
tends to become.219
In order to understand the European approach to electronic
surveillance, it is. important to understand the overriding value of freedom
that can be traced all the way back to the French Revolution, when workers
fought to be recognized as free individuals.
220  The French Revolution
displaced feudal institutions, giving French citizens freedoms such as the
right to contract in its calls for liberty, equality, and 
fraternity.221
In the next section we will show how the workers' rights movement
first developed in Europe in order to explain the path of privacy law as a
fundamental right. In Europe, the right to privacy and correspondence has
been respected as a fundamental right for over fifty years and is still an
important aspect of privacy protection for individuals. Europeans have far
more developed privacy protections than the United States despite having
vastly different "social mores, . . . countries, regions and people,,
22 and
contend to maintain "unity in diversity. 223
219. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (2d ed. 1963).
220. On April 12, 1811, a decade or so after the French Revolution called for
freedom, equality, and fraternity, Beethoven wrote the following note to
Goethe, who authored the tragic story of Egmont, the nobleman who fought to
liberate the Netherlands from Spain's political, economic, and religious
oppression: "You will shortly receive ... the music for Egmont; that glorious
Egmont which through you I have considered, felt and set to music with the
same warm emotions as I experienced when I read it."
Boris Kozolchyk, NAFTA in the Grand and Small Scheme of Things, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAW 135, 135 (1996) (citation omitted).
The first progress towards workers' rights in France came after the French
Revolution, when France was transformed from an absolute monarchy to a republic where
the citizenry theoretically received free and equal rights. The French Revolution was itself
part of a workers' rights movement as the French people were dissatisfied with the grossly
unfair tax system, persecution of religious minorities and the government's interference with
their private life. The French Revolution, available at
http://ap-history-online.tripod.com/apeh8.htm (last visited May 28, 2005).
221. Kozolchyk, supra note 220, at 136.
222. Nonnie L. Shivers, Note, Firing 'Immoral' Public Employees: If Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights Protects Employee Privacy Rights, Then Why Can't
We?, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 621, 654 (2004).
223. Europa, The European Union at a Glance, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/
print indexen.htm (last visited May 28, 2005).
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1. The Rise of the Union Movement
Here, then, is the "curse" of our factory-system; as improvements
in machinery have gone on, the "avarice of masters" has prompted
many to exact more labor from their hands than they were fitted
by nature to perform, and those who have wished for the hours of
labour to be less for all ages than the legislature would even yet
sanction, have had no alternative but to conform more or less to
the prevailing practice, or abandon the trade altogether.224
The American approach to electronic surveillance of employees may
be traced to the view that employers enjoy an absolute sovereignty through
property and contract. In contrast, Europeans have long viewed workplace
privacy as a highly treasured value.225 The rise of the workers' self-
determination movement in Europe was prefigured by organized resistance
to the horrors of early industrialization and its abhorrent factory system.
The union movement is a direct response to the textile industry's conditions
in England during the mid-1700s. Worker self-determination was not a
significant issue prior to 1760 because the mechanical inventions that
deskilled work had yet to be developed.226
No industrial development was as transformative as inventions such as
the Flying Shuttle, The Spinning Jenny, and the Water Frame.227 England
was soon to be in the throes of social change, spearheaded by the
development of the Spinning Jenny by James Hargreaves in 1764.228 Mr.
Hargreaves established a spinning business in Nottingham, leaving his
native Lancashire fearful of that city's hostility to the novel technology. 9
224. John Fielden, The Curse of The Factory System 34-35 (1836), available at
http://www.victorianweb.org/history/workers2.html (last visited May 28, 2005).
225. See Eltis, supra note 18 (explaining the employer sovereignty approach to
electronic surveillance and comparing the American legal system's emphasis on contract
and property to fundamental human ights).
226. ARNOLD TOYNBEE, LECTURES ON THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND (1884),
available at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/3113/toynbee/indrev (last visited
May 28, 2005).
227. At first, however, the absorption of the small freeholders went on slowly. The
process of disappearance has been continuous from about 1700 to the present day, but it is
not true to say, as Karl Marx does, that the yeomanry had disappeared by the middle of the
eighteenth century. It was not till the very period, which we are considering, that is to say
about 1760, that the process of extinction became rapid. Id. See generally E. P. THOMPSON,
THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963); see also E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS &
HUNTERS (1975).
228. This was the first weaving machine that allowed one person to spin many threads at
once and was an improvement of John Key's first "flying shuttle" from 1733. The
Industrial Revolution, Innovations of the Industrial Revolution, at
http://industrialrevolution.sea.ca/innovations.html (last updated Feb. 17, 2003).
229. Luddites-The Machine Breakers, supra note 201.
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The widespread adoption of the "Spinning Jenny" in the textile industry
displaced the traditional hand-loom weavers and other artisans.23
° In 1811
textile manufacturers in Nottingham received letters signed by "General
Ned Ludd and his Army of Redressers.,,
231 The Luddites raged against the
machines of production to protect their jobs. E.P. Thompson, the eminent
English historian, contended that the Luddite saboteurs were more than
machine-smashers, but that they represented a social movement against the
factory system and the price system that constituted the new economic
232
order of capitalism.
William Pitt, the British Prime Minister, convinced Parliament to
enact laws in 1780 and later in 1799 to stave off the "political agitation
among industrial workers.,
23 3 Taking advantage of public panic about the
mushrooming unionist movement, many employers moved to crush all
labor organizations. The British Parliament enacted the so-called
"Combination Laws," "making it illegal for workers to join together to
press their employers for shorter hours or may [sic] pay. As a result trade
unions were thus effectively made illegal.
234  However, in reality the
Combination Acts were unable to prevent workers from organizing unions
and attending clandestine meetings.
235 Despite the legal backlash against
230. E. P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 3 (1963).
231. "Ludd probably did not exist, although there is some suggestion that the name was
derived from that of a Leicestershire farm labourer who had destroyed some stocking frames
about 1782." Luddites-The Machine Breakers, supra note 201.
232. See generally E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CLASS (1963).
And by 1850, England had become an economic titan. Its goal was to supply
two-thirds of the globe with cotton spun, dyed, and woven in the industrial
centers of northern England. England proudly proclaimed itself to be the
'Workshop of the World.' Thomas Carlyle described the emergence of a 'cash
nexus,' where the only connection between men is the one of money, profit and
gain.
The History Guide, Lectures on Modern European Intellectual History, The Origin of the
Industrial Revolution in England (Lecture 17), at http://www.historyguide.org/
intellect/lecture1 7a.html (last revised May 13, 2004).
233. Combination Acts, at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Lcombination.htm (last
visited May 28, 2005).
234. Id.
235. Id. Parliament reversed course only twenty-four years later legitimating trade
unions. Sheffield Trade Outrage, at http://www.shef.ac.uk/misc/personal/cmldjw/lochist/
outragel.htm (last visited May 28, 2005). Robert Owen created the Grand National
Consolidated Trade Union in 1834, the largest and most visionary early national union at
that time, which skyrocketed in membership to over a half million workers within a few
weeks. To join the Grand Union, workers paid an entrance fee of one shilling and swore an
oath during an initiation ceremony. In Dorset village of Tolpuddle there was an act
forbidding illegal oaths. Under this law six men were found guilty and deported to Australia
for seven years. These workers became known as the Tolpuddle Martyrs. However, 
the
"Grand National" was not able to maintain its speedy growth and declined rapidly because
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unions by the government, unions were well established by 1850 and
gradually became more effective in their strategies to improve working
conditions, raise wages, and improve bargaining power. By 1868, workers
formed the first Trade Unions Congress and introduced the Trade Unions
Act of 1871.236
If we fast forward to the new millennium, we see tremendous strides
in workers' rights throughout Europe. This brief synoptic sketch traces the
long struggle for workers' rights that continues to this very day with
improving privacy protections in the electronic workplace. While there is
no more rage against machines of production to protect jobs today,
European workers are keenly aware of their rights that were won through
centuries of struggle. Today, electronic surveillance is the functional
equivalent of the industrial sweatshop of the Eighteenth Century. Modern
employees have information-based concerns, such as how to protect their
private lives in order to prevent their workplace from devolving into
electronic sweatshops. Even if those rights are protected as fundamental
human rights in Europe, there is uncertainty as to how privacy can be
protected against corporate and governmental Big Brothers. The path of
European law has been to balance workers' right to privacy against the
need to protect corporate assets, interests, and rights. The legislation from
the European Council and the European Union reflects a continuing need to
update and modernize fundamental rights in the modern workplace.
2. Efforts by the Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was created after World War II as a
transnational political institution with the aim of protecting human rights
and democracy and fostering peace among its forty-six member states.237
The Council of Europe is not a legal institution of the European
Community, even though its legislative decrees may be binding upon most
of the European countries. 238 The Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, which is enforced by the
European Court of Human Rights, is one of the most important documents
of "its inability to provide adequate support for sections of its membership who were on
strike." Id. This was especially unfortunate at a time when the very principle of trade
unionism was on the defensive. A Web of English History, The Grand National
Consolidated Trade Union (taken from H. Pelling, A History of Trade Unionism), at
http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/terrace/adwO3/peel/trade-us/gnctu.htm (last modified
Dec. 5, 2004).
236. The Industrial Revolution, supra note 228.
237. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Council of Europe Portal, at
http://www.coe.int/DefaultEN.asp (last updated May 27, 2005).
238. The Convention is respected in the European Community through Maastricht Treaty
of 1992 and stated as the general principles of E.U. law.
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underlying the right to privacy.239 Individuals can file a complaint to this
Court provided all national remedies have been exhausted. During the last
few decades European policymaker have discussed what comprises the
private sphere. It is important to understand how the European Court of
Human Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms work in order to understand the European law of
electronic monitoring. Most privacy-based legislation in Europe, including
statutes governing personal data, privacy, and protection of e-mails, has its
genesis in the Council of Europe's Convention.
a. The Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950
In Modern Europe, the devastating impact of two World Wars left the
continent fractured, displacing individual rights. After the Second World
War, the countries of Europe banded together to develop community-wide
legislation to protect individual human rights. The Council of Europe
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR) reflects a Europe-wide movement to guarantee
individual rights.240 The ECHR is a legal norm incorporated by reference
into the national legislation of each member state. Since the vast majority
of European countries are civil code jurisdictions, the ECHR is self-
executing. 24' The European Court of Human Rights is a special court,
situated in Strasbourg, and is the principal enforcement agency of the
Convention. The Court receives its mandate under the ECHR as amended
239. Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, The European Court Of Human
Rights: Historical Background, Organisation and Procedure (Sept. 2003), at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm.
240. Article 8 of the ECHR is about the Right to Respect for Private and Family life.
Article 8 says:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
ECHR, supra note 209.
241. In a civil code jurisdiction, the convention has a self-executing effect as soon as it is
duly signed and ratified. In England, which is a common law country, a convention does
not come into effect until it has been enacted into domestic law by an Act of the Parliament.
The Human Rights Act in England came as late as 1998 and did not come into force until
2000, despite the fact that England was the first member state to sign the Convention.
Eurolegal Services, UK Human Rights, at http://www.eurolegal.org/british/
ukhumanrights.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2005).
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by Protocol 11,242 and is available to any contracting state or individual
when all domestic remedies are exhausted. 243 All final judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights are binding on the respondent states, and
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the
execution of the judgments.2'
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms expressly states: "Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his
correspondence., 245 The European Court of Human Rights has extended
the definition of "private life and correspondence" as articulated in Article
8 to include all business relations as well as e-mail and other electronic
communications. 246 Article 8 of the ECHR articulates a basic fundamental
right to privacy embodied in the constitutions of European countries,247 and
grants all Europeans the fundamental right to have their privacy
respected.248  Since the enactment of the ECHR, there have been a few
cases interpreting what the right to private life means in specific contexts.
In Niemietz v. Gennany,24 9 the European Court of Human Rights
expanded the meaning of "private life" from the "inner circle" of an
individual's life to also include the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings.250 The Niemietz decision is a useful
precedent for extending the ECHR to encompass workplace privacy. The
Court also raised concerns in a situation where governments were to make
a clear distinction between private life and professional life. They
contended that such a distinction would likely lead to unequal treatment.25 1
The Niemietz court's ruling that Article 8 would only be triggered if
professional life and private life were so intermingled that there is no
242. Protocol 11 (ETS No. 55) entered into force November 1, 1998.
243. The procedure is adversarial and public. The European Court of Human Rights:
Historical Background, Organization and Procedure, supra note 239.
244. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe consists of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the member states or their representative. Id.
245. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
246. Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (1992); Halford v. United Kingdom, 39
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1004 (1997).
247. Frank Hendrickx, Legal Regulation of Disclosure of Information About Employees
or Prospective Employees to Employers or Prospective Employers in Belgium, 21 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 651, 653 (2000) (noting that Article 8 is a "basic source of law to be
mentioned.., the constitutional right to privacy," which is also protected by Article 22 of
the Belgian Constitution).
248. However, it is important to point out that Article 8 does not give an absolute right to
privacy, but the right to have privacy respected. See ECHR, supra note 209.
249. Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23 (discussing a search of a lawyer's office, based on
a broad search warrant).
250. Id. at 33.
251. Id.
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means to distinguish between them is promising, though it refused to make
252such a distinction in that case. The Niemietz court states that the
meaning of the word "correspondence" is not limited to private
correspondence, and concludes that Article 8 protects correspondence
regardless of whether it is private or professional. 3
In Halford v. United Kingdom Government,254 the European Court of
Human Rights considered the issue of whether Article 8 of ECHR applied
to the interception of personal phone calls at work. In Halford the
applicant had applied several times for a promotion as an Assistant Chief
Constable in the police force where she was working, but was denied the
position every time.255 Ms. Halford commenced a proceeding against the
Chief Constable and the Home Secretary for discrimination for failing to
promote her on grounds of sex.25 6 Certain of her co-workers in the police
force launched a campaign against her, which led to leaks to the press and
secret interception of her phone calls, both at home and at her office.257
The information obtained by tapping her office and her home phones was
used against her in the discrimination proceeding and led to the decision to
bring a disciplinary proceeding against her. 8
The Halford court held that the surreptitious interception of private
calls made by Ms. Halford from her office was in fact an unjustifiable
interference with her right to privacy and correspondence. 259 The reasoning
employed by the European Court of Human Rights applies equally well to
any monitoring or recording of private correspondence contained in e-mail,
faxes, wireless communications, and all technological means of
correspondence. 260 In Halford, the government attempted to formulate a
252. Id.
253. Id. at 34. See Huvig v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36, 41, 52 (1990) (discussing
where the search was directed solely against business activities and documents, including
wiretapping of applicant's telephone, but the court did not even advert the possibility that
Article 8 might be inapplicable just because the correspondence was of professional
character and held that there had been a violation of Article 8).
254. Halford v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1004 (1997).
255. Id. at 1009. In order to get the position she needed an approval from the Home
Office, which was withheld by the Chief Constable.
256. Id. at 1009.
257. Id. at 1009-10. Halford had two phones in her office, one of which was for private
use, but both were part of the internal police telephone network that is classified as a
"public" telecommunication system." Neither restriction nor guidance of how to use either
phone was give to Halford; however, Halford received memoranda allowing her to use the
"private" phone for the purposes of her sex-discrimination case. Id. at 1010, 1012.
258. Id. at 1010-11.
259. The court recognizes that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy,
especially since she had no prior warning about the interception and was granted to use the
phones for delicate private matters. Id. at 10 15-16.
260. Internet and E-Mail Policies, ACAs ADVICE LEAFLET (Acas, London, U.K.), Mar.
2004, available at http://www.acas.org.uk/publications/AL06.html (last visited May 4,
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property-based argument similar to American law, contending that an
employer should be able to monitor telephones provided by the employer
without providing the employee notice.26' The Halford court refused to
make any distinction between professional and private correspondence in
order to protect one group of correspondence more or less than the other,
2 62
This critically important precedent is emblematic of the court's
unwillingness to accept the bifurcated distinction between the private and
public spheres so well established under American law. The Halford case
is also important because it demonstrates that the court is unwilling to
accord employers the right to monitor merely because they have a property
interest in information technologies. 63 Private correspondence does not
lose its status as private simply because devices at work, in the office, are
used. Private communications remains private regardless of what
technologies are employed, which is a fundamentally different approach to
the American property-based and contract-based regime for electronic
surveillance.2 6
The Halford court also noted that when it comes to secret
"surveillance or interception of communications by public authorities, there
is an additional concern because of the danger that power will be
abused.'2 65  The court expressed its concern that secret surveillance is
marked by a lack of public scrutiny and that domestic national law must
provide remedies as well as protection to the individual against arbitrary
interference with Article 8 rights.266 This clearly demonstrates that the
European Court of Human Rights is predisposed to policing cases in which
employers misuse their power by intercepting electronic communications.
Thus, European employees have greater protection than their American
counterparts.
3. Initiative by the European Union
European labor law is largely governed by national legislation, which
means that there will be variations in protections granted to workers. The
Treaty of The European Union recognizes the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and requires each
member state to respect the fundamental right of privacy.267 In addition,
2005).
261. Halford, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1016.
262. Id. (following Huvig and Niemietz).
263. Id.; see, e.g., McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4103 (Tex. App. 1999).
264. See Part I infra.
265. Halford, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 1017.
266. Id.
267. Lasprogata et al., supra note 15, at T 8.
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the European Community (EC) has enacted basic guidelines that all
member states must follow and that raise the bar for workers rights.268 The
general policy of the EC has been to promote, protect and enable the
development of the Internet in a single market, since the promotion of
technology is so important for the economy and society. In the March
2000 Lisbon Meeting of The European Council, the E.U. proposed a new
strategic goal for the next decade "to become the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.' 269
Europe's dual enforcement system has its roots in the harmonizing
principles of the Rome Treaty. 270 The E.U. formed new legal institutions to
carry out its objective of shrinking national borders and ensuring greater
competition. Each head of state of the forty-six member states belongs to
the Council of the European Union, which is a major policy-making
institution responsible for whatever matters are on the particular agenda:
foreign affairs, farming, industry, transport, or emergent issues.271  The
European Parliament is the elected body representing the 452 million E.U.
citizens and consists of 732 directly elected representatives of member
268. See Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (1989) (giving
member states a minimum provision for employment and working conditions). Activities of
the European Union, Summaries of Legislation, Anti-Discrimination, Fundamental Social
Rights and Civil Society, at http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/cl0107.htm (last
visited May 4, 2005).
269. Also referred to as the Lisbon Switch Strategy. Europa, Employment and Social
Affairs, European Employment Strategy, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/
employment strategy/index-en.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2004). In 2003, surveys showed
that in Sweden and Finland over ninety percent of all enterprises of all sizes were connected
to the Internet, on average this percentage was about seventy-three percent in the E.U. New
Technology and Respect for Privacy at the Workplace, supra note 207.
270. Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome states the following principle:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or
activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community
a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and
non inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of
convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of
social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997),
art. 2 [hereinafter EC TREATY], available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/
en/entr6b.htm#Article 2 (last visited May 22, 2005).
271. The European Council is a key decision-making institution, which is responsible for
foreign affairs, farming, industry, transport or other emergent issues. Europa, Activities of
the European Union: Summaries of Legislation, Anti-Discrimination, Fundamental Social
Rights and Civil Society, at http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10107.htm (last
visited May 28, 2005).
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states.272  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg ensures
member states' compliance with the legislation of the European Union.273
The European Commission is the chief institution to develop legal
frameworks for the Internet to advance free competition in the single
market. It is also the principal formulator of privacy law, because it is a
body with powers of initiative, implementation, management, and
control.274  The Commission approved the E.U.'s key related directives:
the E-Commerce Directive, E-Signatures Directive, Distance Selling
Directive, Data Protection Directive, Database Protection Directive, and the
Copyright Directive.275
The still-evolving European Union will have a greater influence on the
path of Internet privacy now that accession is completed. 6  In order to
272. Id.
273. For more information about the European Court of Justice, see CVRIA, The Court
of Justice of the European Communities, at http://www.curia.eu.int/ (last visited May 28,
2005).
274. European Parliament, supra note 271.
275. Directives must be implemented by each Member State. However, there is no
consistent pattern in implementing E.U. Directives. For example, only four Member States
enacted legislation implementing the Data Protection Directive within the October 1998
deadline agreed to "when they adopted the Directive in the Council.
The Commission decided in December 1999 to take France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands to the European Court of Justice. Germany
and the Netherlands, along with Belgium, then implemented the Directive in
2001 and Luxembourg, after the Court found against it, implemented the
Directive in 2002. More than seven years after the adoption of the Directive
and more than four years after the deadline for its implementation (Oct. 1998),
France has still not yet passed the legislation necessary to bring its old data
protection law of 1978 fully into line with the Directive.
Press Release, Commission of the European Communities, Data Protection: Commission
Report Shows That EU Law Is Achieving its Main Aims (May 16, 2003), available at
LEXIS, European Union database.
276. The European Union has recently been enlarged with ten new member states from
eastern and southern European countries, including Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Additionally, the E.U.
is currently preparing the accession of four other countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and
Turkey. European Parliament, supra note 271. In Eastern Europe countries such as
Romania and Bulgaria, there is a presently low computer and Internet usage rate. A survey
found "Internet availability and access is very high, with an average of 90% of the
respondents reporting that they have Internet access. The lowest penetration was in
Romania, in which roughly a quarter, 50 of 209 respondents, reported not having Internet
access. The PC usage was also lower in Romania. Of the companies that have Internet
access, a varying number of employees make regular use of the Internet in their work
routine. On average Polish SMEs have a relatively high level of usage, while fewer
employees regularly use the Internet in Romania, Cyprus, and Bulgaria." JNN &
Associates, eBusiness in Southeastern Europe: Facts and Figures, at http://www.jnn-
marketing.com/index.php?p=anl_2003&mt=free (last visited May 28, 2005).
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make the relationship between the Convention on Human Rights of the
European Council and the protection of privacy in the European Union
clearer, we will first explain their relationship and compare the specific
articles comparable to Article 8 ECHR. Next, we will describe the main
directives on privacy in the European Union and show how those directives
can be applied to an employment context, where the unions struggle for
workers' rights in the technological revolution, instead of in the Industrial
Revolution.277
a. E. U. Protections for Private Life and Personal Data
In 2000, in Nice, the European Union proclaimed the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) in order to
catalogue the fundamental rights of Europe's citizens, which are somewhat
based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg and the ECJ in Luxembourg.278 The Charter was an effort to
bring together all the rights that were spread out in several different
legislative instruments, such as the Convention from the European Council,
documents from the United Nations, and national laws.2 79 The Charter
protects the traditional rights (e.g., right to life, freedom of expression) as
well as more modem rights such as data security and security of
communication regardless of means used.28°
Articles 7 and 8 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union protect private and family life and personal data.28' In drafting
Article 7, the authors of the Charter took the technological evolution into
account by replacing the term "correspondence," used in Article 8 of the
ECHR, with "communications." This change in wording guarantees
protection for communications regardless of the means of communication
277. "The OECD Guidelines and the 1981 Council of Europe Convention each
incorporates rules that require personal data protection from collection through
dissemination, and guarantee the right of individuals to access information collected about
them and make changes where necessary to correct inaccuracies." Lasprogata et al., supra
note 15, at 13.
278. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1 [hereinafer Charter], available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/libe/elsj/
charter/default en.htm.
279. The Charter helps to develop the concept of citizenship of the European Union and
to create an area of freedom, security and justice, as laid down in the preamble. The Charter
also enhances the legal security of the protection of fundamental rights. Id.
280. Today every new legislative instrument produced by the E.U. must contain this
statement: "this act respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognized
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as general
principles of Community." However, the Charter will not be fully legally binding until the
proposed Constitution of the European Union is adopted. Id.
281. Id. at art. 7.
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used.182  This means that even in the formulation of the right to
correspondence, the E.U. did not distinguish between the types of means
used for the communication, which the U.S. clearly has done through case
law by giving e-mail less protection than phone calls.283
The Charter also makes the right of protection of personal data a
separate fundamental right in Article 8, distinct from the general privacy
accorded to family life and communications.2 84 The guaranteed protection
of personal data covers the processing of this data as soon as it enters the
boundaries of the Union or comes within the scope of E.U. institutions and
bodies, irrespective of the medium used.285  Furthermore, the right to
protection of personal data must be balanced with freedoms of expression
and information, which means that even if the information is personal data,
the public interest value of that information might be so strong that it
prevails, and the information becomes public.286  Regardless of the
outcome, the opposing interests must be weighed in each individual case,
and in Europe, the bar to get the information to the public is much higher
than in the U.S. The U.S. tends to be more protective of media rights, such
as the right to free speech which is protected in the Constitution, than the
right of privacy.
b. Directives Protecting Privacy and Personal Data
Each member state of the E.U. follows a dual system of regulation
composed of national legislation and E.U. regulations. 87 When it comes to
282. Article 7 states that "everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and
family life, home and communications," and is equivalent to Article 8 ECHR. Id.
283. American courts have distinguished between private and professional mail, but not
between personal and professional e-mails. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878);
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); Vernars v. Young 539 F.2d
966 (3d Cir. 1976). E.U. policy on telecommunications and electronic communications
services is regulated by Directive 2002/58/EC of July 12, 2002 (replacing the Directive
97/66/EC of December 15, 1997). European Parliament and Council Directive on Privacy
and Electronic Communications, 2002/58/EC, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L. 201) 37, available at
http://europe.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/-201/1-20120020731en00370047.pdf (last
visited May 22, 2005). The Telecommunications Directive adopts the concept of
technological neutrality that parallels Article 7 of the Charter, seeking to avoid measures
favoring or disfavoring any specific communication means. Id. The goal of the Directive is
to ensure an equivalent level of user protection, irrespective of the service used. Id.
284. Charter, art. 8 (providing rules governing protection of personal data), available at
http://www.europarl.eu.intlcomparl/libe/elsj/charter/artO8/default-en.htm (last visited May
22, 2005).
285. Id.
286. This right includes "the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." ECHR, art. 10; see
also Charter, art. II (elaborating on Article 10 of the ECHR).
287. The 1957 Treaty of Rome created new legal institutions designed to harmonize the
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Internet regulation, the E.U. follows a command and control model that is
more rule-oriented than the market-driven approach of the United States.
European competition law, for example, favors bright-line rules for
determining anti-competitive behavior, in contrast to the broad standards of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.288 When an E.U. directive is adopted, the
member states normally have a certain transition time to implement the
rules into their national legislation. 289
In October 1995, the EC adopted a directive on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data between member states.
290 This Directive applies
to all data, processed both by automatic means (e.g., computers) and by
traditional non-automated filing (e.g., paper files). It ensures the rights and
freedoms of natural persons with respect to processing personal data and
describes when such processing is lawful.291
All Europeans have the right to privacy in the collection of personally
identifiable data and the right to have their personal information protected
by adequate security. 292 The Data Protection Directive gives data subjects
control over the collection, transmission, or use of personal information.
293
The data subject also has the right to be notified of all uses and disclosures
about data collection and processing.294  All companies, for example, are
required to obtain explicit consent as to the collection of data on
race/ethnicity, political opinions, union membership, physical or mental
law. The purpose of uniform laws throughout Europe is to facilitate commerce and reduce
transaction costs in cross-border transactions. Directives are formulated by the European
Commission, finalized by the European Parliament and adopted by the European Council.
TREATY OF ROME, supra note 270.
288. A good example of greater emphasis on rules is Article 82 of the EC treaty. EC
TREATY art. 2. Article 82 attempts to prevent price-fixing and other unilateral activities. Id.
In order to be liable for price-fixing, the anticompetitive entity must have a dominant
position defined as at least fifty percent control of the market. See Jessica Natale, Practice
Pointer: Complying with EU Competition Law, in E-BUSINESS LEGAL HANDBOOK, 8-117
(Michael Rustad & Cyrus Daftary eds., 2003).
289. This transition time is normally two to five years depending on how complicated
and extensive the directive is. After the transition time is up, the directive will be enforced
to the benefit of the citizens regardless if the member state has implemented the directive or
not. If the directive has direct effect that will say if the directive is so clear and precise.
290. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (governing the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data).
291. Id.
292. Id. at arts. 1, 17.
293. Id. at arts. 6, 10, 11, 12. The European Commission has published a guide named
"Data protection in the European Union," which provides citizens and businesses with
information about their rights regarding the collection and use of personal information.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, available at
http://www.europe.eu.int/conmmjustice-hme/fsj/pivacy/dcs/guide/guideukingdom-en.
pdf (last visited May 22, 2005).
294. Council Directive, supra note 290, at arts. 12, 14.
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health, sex life, and criminal records. 95 Data subjects have the right to
obtain copies of information collected as well as the right to correct or
delete personal data.
2 96
The general principles in the Data Protection Directive were expanded
by a new Directive on Privacy and Electronic communication in 2002,
which targets specific privacy issues relating to electronic communi-
297cations. The directive specifically states that the confidentiality of
communications prohibits the practice of interception or surveillance of
private communications between others over networks.2 98  This is an
extension of the protection already recognized for private phone calls to
also include e-mails, SMS and MMS messages.2 99 Gaining access to or
storing information from a user's terminal (e.g., PC, mobile phone or other
similar devices) is only allowed if the user is given clear information about
the purpose of any such invisible activity and is offered the right to refuse
it.3°° The Directive on Privacy and Electronic communication primarily
focuses on public communication networks and does not necessarily
include internal work e-mails.
This means that though public employees are directly protected
against surveillance under this directive, it does not necessarily follow that
private employees' communications are protected on internal networks.
However, when private employees access a public network, these
regulations automatically protect them. Employers are left with a limited
area of employee communication that they can monitor according to these
directives. This shows that the directives do not adequately protect
employees in all aspects against monitoring and surveillance by their
employers. This problem has been raised by the European Commission,
which is trying to develop a new directive specifically targeting the
protection of workers' personal data, with the collaboration of trade unions
and employers' organizations, in order to find a balance.
295. Id. at arts. 7(a), 8(2).
296. Id. at art. 12.
297. The EC has also created some guidelines when it comes to privacy on the Internet
in their Recommendation 2/2001 "on certain minimum requirements for collecting personal
data on-line in the European Union." See European Union, Data Protection at
http://europa.eu.int/information-society/topics/ecomm/all-about/todays-framework/privacy
_protection/index en.htm (last visited May 4, 2005).
298. Council Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communication, supra note 283, at art.
5(1) (prohibiting listening, tapping, storage and other kind of interception or surveillance of
communication without consent).
299. European Commission, Privacy Protection, at http://europa.eu.int/information_
society/topics/ecomm/all-about/todays-framework/privacy-protection/index_en.htm (last
updated Dec. 5, 2004).
300. Council Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 283, at
art. 5(2).
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c. The E. U. Directives in an Employment Context
The European Commission launched a consultation in 2001 asking its
social partners about the protection of workers' personal data and whether
they believed that the protections granted by the two personal data
directives, Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and Directive on the
Protection of Privacy 97/66/EC, were enough.
3' The responses to the
consultation showed that all of the social partners agreed upon the
importance of the question of the privacy of personal data processing in the
employment context, particularly considering the socioeconomic and
technological developments of the last years.
302 However, there were many
disagreements between employers' associations and trade unions about
how the E.U. should continue its actions.
30 3
The employers' organizations thought that the existing directives were
appropriate and capable of ensuring that workers' personal data is
protected.3°4 They rather emphasized the importance of flexibility and
national diversity, as well as the risk of over-regulation and the undue
burden on employers.3 °5 These organizations favored awareness, best
practice rules and non-binding national instruments.
30 6  Trade unions,
however, argued that the two directives in place were too general and that
there is a need for more specific rules about privacy regarding electronic
communications at work. 307 Further, they did not think that the national
legislation in place was totally satisfactory.
3 8  Even with the broad
European regulation in this area, trade unions believed that employers have
an unfair privilege in monitoring their employees.
Based on the outcome of the first consultation, the European
Commission launched a second consultation with the aim of visualizing a
proposal for a new directive for a framework of employment-specific rules
on data protection in the workplace.
309  One of the reasons for the
301. Catherine Delbar et al., New Technology and Respect for Privacy at the Workplace,
EUR. INDUS. REL. OBSERVATORY ONLINE, Dec. 8, 2003, at http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/
2003/07/study/TN03071018.html.
302. European Commission, Second Stage Consultation of Social Partners on the
Protection of Workers' Personal Data, 2 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/
labour__law/docs/secondstageconsultationdataprot-en.pdf (last visited May 22, 2005).
303. Id. at 3.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 3, 7.
308. Id.
309. Andrea Boughton, Commission issues second stage consultation on data protection,
EUR. INDUS. REL. OBSERVATORY ONLINE, Nov. 20, 2002, at
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/
2 0 0 2 /1 l/feature/eu0211206f.html. The Commission is
planning a draft of a new Directive in 2004 or 2005 according to its mid-term review
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framework is to be able to promote and ensure that European workers
become more mobile and still have a boundary between work and private
life. Some other reasons are globalization, the trend of outsourcing human
resources, and insecurity after September 11, 2001.310 This new directive
would deal with issues such as consent, medical data, genetic testing,
monitoring and surveillance, seeking especially to clarify the legal
environment for monitoring and surveillance, as well as to ensure
compliance with fundamental human rights.31 ' Clarification of monitoring
and surveillance laws is also important because advanced information
technologies are more intrusive on private life than traditional telephone-
tapping and video surveillance. 32 E-mail and Internet monitoring threatens
to erode workers' privacy.3 13 The proposal advocates greater consultation
by anyone handling personal information. The proposed regime imposes
restrictive monitoring rules in the employment context.3 14  Under the
proposal, in order to monitor a specific worker, the employer must have
reasonable suspicion of criminal activities or serious wrongdoing or
misconduct, and there must be no less intrusive means available. 315 The
opening of private e-mails and files would be totally prohibited,
irrespective of whether personal use of these work tools was authorized, all
private electronic communications are protected as "private
correspondence" in light of the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.316  This approach is fundamentally
equivalent to the way France already deals with privacy of correspondence
at work.
d. The Position of the European Court of Justice
The ECJ has pointed out the importance of companies having written
and signed e-mail policies on hand in order to enforce them and to monitor
employees' e-mail communications. This is contrary to the willingness of
U.S. courts to validate secret surveillance of e-mail even if the company
assured its employees that all e-mail would remain confidential and
(European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: Mid-term Review of the Social Policy Agenda, COM (2003) 312, at 16). As to
date, the Commission has not yet produced such a directive.
310. Id. at 8.
311. Id. at9.
312. Delbar et al., supra note 301, at 6.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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privileged."7 However, the ECJ has not yet decided a case about
employers' general right to monitor employees' Internet and e-mail use.
However, the court validated an employer's Internet policy in X v.
European Central Bank.318 After an internal investigation, the bank's
investigators found that X, an employee of European Central Bank (ECB),
was downloading and transmitting pornography and political documents to
third parties using his work computer.
319 X transmitted pornographic
materials to an ECB coworker who objected to these materials. The
coworker felt that she was being sexually harassed with these inappropriate
communications and complained to X on several occasions that he had no
right to transmit these materials.
320 X was suspended by the ECB after an
investigation of his inappropriate use of e-mail and the Internet.
32' The
applicant in ECB did not challenge the financial institution on grounds of
invasion of privacy, but rather on the contractual validity of its Internet
policy.3 22 The contractual ECB policy expressly provided that the bank's
Internet technologies were for business use only, and by downloading
pornographic files and harassing co-workers by sending them the files, X
clearly misused the Internet at work.
323  The ECB court upheld the
suspension, concluding that the bank had the right to set up internal
disciplinary rules for breaches of employment agreements.
3 4 Because the
employee agreed not to abuse the computer system as a condition of
employment, the bank's disciplinary action was within the contract of
employment.3 25 ECB demonstrates that a company has the right to draw up
internal employment rules about misuses of Electronic communication that
constitute immoral, criminal acts.
317. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pilsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 98, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the employee's e-mail communications even though
the employer repeatedly assured that all the e-mail communications would 
remain
confidential and privileged).
318. Case T-333/99, X v. European Central Bank, 2001 E.C.R. 11-3021, IA-00199, II-
00921 (2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgilsga-docsmartapi !celexapi!
prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=
6 1999A0333&model=guichett (last visited May 22,
2005).
319. Id. at 5, para. 8.
320. Id. at 5, para. 13.
321. Id. at 5, para. 8.
322. Id. at 7, para. 27.
323. Id. at 4, para. 5.
324. The court concluded that ECB had the capacity to set up disciplinary contractual
rules according to its Conditions of Employment, which X had signed and agreed to, and
dismissed all of plaintiff's claims.
325. Id. at 15, paras. 87-88.
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C. United Kingdom Law & Policy
The EC has promulgated privacy protection in several directives
encompassing "constitutional law, employment law, data protection and
telecommunications legislation. 32 6 Yet, the European member states vary
in the extent of their privacy protection. Sweden, for example, has yet to
enact a comprehensive privacy statute applicable to electronic
technology.3 27 In Sweden, there are a large number of teleworkers but
courts have provided no real guidance on the electronic monitoring of e-
mail or Internet usage.328
This section focuses on legal developments in the United Kingdom
(U.K.) because it is a common law country and the cradle of Anglo-
American tradition. In the next sub-section we compare the U.K. approach
to the French civil law tradition. We briefly discuss the emerging problem
of telecommuting employees, recognizing the growing trend of "traveling"
or telecommuting employees who are connected and available to their
employers 24/7, but not necessarily in a fixed location.329  Our
overwhelming finding is that the laws of e-mail and Internet monitoring for
the U.K. and France diverge markedly from the path of U.S. law.
The U.K. is the only European country that follows the common law
system and has a similar legal structure to America. Even though there is a
shared common law heritage, there is little harmony between the law of
electronic monitoring in the U.S. and in the U.K. In some respects, this
divergence can be explained by the U.K.'s membership in the E.U., which
requires it to follow the fundamental rights approach honed in civil law
jurisdictions. Under the European Community Treaty, the U.K. must
implement enabling legislation to carry out the fundamental rights as set
326. Submission to the Victorian Law Reform Commission on its Issues Paper into
Workplace Privacy, VLCR INQUIRY INTO WORKPLACE PRIVACY (Office of the Victorian
Privacy Comm'r, Melbourne, Australia), Apr. 11, 2003, at 5, available at
http:/lwww.privacy.vic.gov.au/dir I00/priweb.nsf/0/5d37ecb57a98bda7ca256c4dOO I9e8ad?
OpenDocument&ExpandSection=5.
327. See, e.g., Reinhold Fahlbeck, A Comparative Study of the Impact of Electronic
Technology on Workplace Disputes: Electronic Technology and Work: A Swedish
Perspective, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 257 (2002).
328. See id. (stating that privacy-related provisions can be found in many statutes, but
are not always well synchronized). The 1998 Personal Data Protection Act is the single
most important piece of legislation. Case law on employer monitoring is nonexistent.
Fahlbeck contends that Article 6 of Chapter 2 of the Personal Data Protection Act may be
extended to electronic surveillance. This Article states: "[A]II citizens shall be protected in
their relation with the public realm against ... examination of mail or other confidential
correspondence and against secret tapping or recording of telephone calls or other
confidential communications." Fahlbeck futher argues that "[a]lthough this rule appears to
be comprehensive in its prohibitions, Article 12 of the same chapter permits limitations,
albeit only to achieve a purpose acceptable in a democratic society." Id. at 265.
329. Id. at 264.
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forth in the ECHR and the legislation of the E.U. These two bodies of law
are vital to the development of the U.K.'s law of e-mail surveillance.
In the U.K., as in the U.S., employers routinely implement software-
based employee monitoring solutions.
33° A survey of more than two
hundred British firms found that these companies terminated sixty-one
employees for abuse of e-mail and the Internet at work in 2002."3 Seventy
percent of all the U.K.'s Internet pornographic transmissions took place
during the nine-to-five workday, which is a finding that supports the
employer's need to monitor electronic commissions.
332  Further, an
estimated thirty to forty percent of U.K. workplace computer usage is not
related to work.333 The estimated cost to employers for unauthorized
workplace access to Channel 4's Big Brother series was °300,000 per
day. 334 An estimated two-thirds of personal online purchases of goods and
services in the U.K. are made on office computers during the workday.
335
All of these surveys demonstrate that the misuse of electronic
communications is a widespread problem.
1. Legislation on Internet Monitoring
The U.K. has adopted a predominately regulatory approach to Internet
and e-mail monitoring in the workplace as opposed to relying heavily upon
market-based incentives, as in the U.S. The British Prime Minister
promised that the government would ensure that everyone in the U.K. who
wants access to the Internet should have it by 2005.336 The principal reason
for this initiative was the government's desire to promote business and
economic growth. However, the government tacitly accepted the right of
businesses to monitor their employees.
337 As in the U.S., the doctrine of
vicarious or imputed liability makes U.K. employers generally liable for
acts committed by employees within the scope of their employment duties.
330. See Ingenuity (UK) Ltd., Welcome to Ingenuity 
(UK) Ltd, at
http://www.ingenuity.co.uk/ (last visited May 28, 2005) (describing Ingenuity (UK) 
Ltd.'s
software that monitors employees' Internet usage).
331. Andrew Bibby, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, FREELANCER.DK 
(2002), at
http://www.freelancer.dk/default.asp?pageToLoad=visNyhed%2Easp%3FartikellD%3
D248.
332. See Eugenie Houston, E-mail Privacy at Work, MONSTER 
HUMAN RESOURCES
(2002), at http://hr.monster.ie/articles/email-privacy/print/ (citing a study performed 
by the
British research firm Websense).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. CABINET OFFICE, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AT WORK: WHAT 
You NEED TO
KNOW (2d ed. 2001), at www.e-envoy.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/00/54/55/04005455.pdf.
337. Courts in the U.K. have not yet handed down decisions shaping 
the law of e-mail
monitoring in the workplace.
886 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:4
Excessive private use of communications facilities at work can corrode the
efficiency of the company, disturb security, and expose the company to
lawsuits. 3" But, at the same time, the U.K. does not allow surreptitious
monitoring by the employer as in America. The U.K. balances the right of
employers to monitor against workers' privacy rights, by prohibiting secret
monitoring.
There are five main statutes that regulate Internet monitoring in the
U.K., and to date there are few cases. The Data Protection Act of 1998139
was the implementation of the European Data Protection Directive
concerning the right of freedom for individuals regarding the processing of
personal data. The Human Rights Act of 1998 and OFTEL Guidance on
Recording on Private Telephone Conversations of 1999, were both enacted
in response to the Halford case decided by the ECHR in 1997, concerning
the respect of private communication at work according to Article 8
HCHR.
Finally, the Regulatory of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 closely
tracks the Lawful Business Practice Regulations of 2000, which provides
the ground rules for when employers may intercept and monitor e-mails
and Internet access at work. If an employer breaches the Data Protection
Act, for example, he is subject to civil and criminal liability and may be
fined up to £5,000. 3 4 0 In stark contrast to the pro-employer regime of
electronic surveillance in America, the U.K.'s regulatory regime arms the
victims of abusive monitoring with meaningful remedies.
a. Data Protection and Privacy
British employers' electronic surveillance of their employees' e-mail
and Internet usage must comply with the U.K.'s implementation of the
European Union Directive on Data Protection. The U.K. Data Protection
Act (DPA), enacted in 1998, provides another remedy against abusive
electronic surveillance. The DPA requires the "data controller," the one
processing the information, to notify employees about the monitoring
system as well as protect the data according to special "Data Protection
Principles. 341  The DPA carves out one exception to the notice
requirement: It allows surveillance without notification when electronic
338. CABINET OFFICE, supra note 336.
339. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
340. ROBERT MUCKLE SOLICITORS & WATERFORD TECHNOLOGIES, E-MAIL MONITORING
IN THE WORKPLACE: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO EMPLOYERS 1 (July 2003).
341. These principles can be summarized into: fairly and lawfully processed; processed
for limited purposes; adequate, relevant and not excessive information; accurate; not kept
longer than necessary; processed in accordance with the data subject's rights, secure and not
transferred to countries without adequate protection. NICK HIGHAM & SARA ELGSTRAND,
DENTON, WILDE AND SAPTE, DATA PROTECTION OVERVIEW § 2 (2001).
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monitoring is done for the purpose of preventing a specific crime.
342 The
DPA requires that all monitoring be lawful and fair to employees, to protect
personally identifiable data.343 Further, a monitoring program must be
reasonably related to achieving a legitimate business purpose while
respecting the privacy of individuals.344 It would not, for example, be a
violation of the DPA for a system's administrator to access files in order to
detect and remove a computer virus from the system, since this act would
not involve reading the content of incoming e-mails.
The DPA also takes into account the requirements of the Human
Rights Act of 1998 (HRA).3 45 The HRA has yet to explicitly define the
meaning of privacy in judicial decisions, but it is clear that "private
correspondence is expressly protected, alongside telephone and e-mail
communications. 346  When it comes to employment claims under the
HRA, the statute distinguishes between public and private sector
employers. If the employer falls into the public category, the employee has
a direct cause of action under the ECHR.347
As in the other countries of the EC, workers in the U.K. are also
protected by Article 8 of the ECHR, which generally respects family life,
the home, and correspondence. Private employees in the U.K. (and other
European countries) can use Article 8 ECHR as a means of challenging
abusive monitoring practices. If the employer is classified as a private
employer, then the Convention gives only indirect guidance on the way
courts and tribunals approach and interpret existing common law/statutory
rights. The court may be asked to consider the monitoring in "light of
his/her right to privacy under [Article 8 in] the HCHR.
3 4 s
The U.K.'s chief regulatory agency, called OFTEL,349 issued
"Guidance on Recording on Private Conversations in 1999" to govern the
monitoring of calls. The purpose of these guidelines was to provide
businesses with safe harbor information on how to implement electronic
monitoring without violating the privacy of their employees. OFTEL's
342. Id. at 7.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. The Act came into force on October 2, 2000 and was enacted to implement the
ECHR of 1950.
346. NICK HIGHAM & SARA ELGSTRAND, DATA PROTECTION OVERVIEW (2001).
347. See § 6(1) of the HRA (stating that "[i]t is unlawful for a public authority to act
contrary to a Convention right" (HCHR), including employment).
348. JOANNE SAWYER, PURSUING PRIVACY AT WORK THROUGH THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT,
Liberty, U.K. (2001).
349. OFTEL was the U.K. regulator for the telecommunications industry, but has been
replaced by Ofcom. Ofcom is an independent regulator and competition authority for the
UK communications industries, with responsibilities across television, radio,
telecommunications and wireless communications services. See Office of Communications,
About Ofcom, at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about_ofcom/ (last visited May 28, 2005).
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document tacitly assumes that Internet access has the same protection as
telephone communications under European law.350 It is likely that courts in
all European states will be more receptive to extending privacy-based rules
for telephone usage to communications over the Internet, in stark contrast
to American judicial decisions. Workers in the U.S. currently enjoy no
reasonable expectation of privacy for e-mail communications at work
because courts treat business computers as the property of the employer
rather than as personal computers.35' In contrast to the fundamental rights
approach evolving in the U.K., American courts do not recognize a privacy
interest in personal e-mail folders or correspondence.
b. The Regulation of Investigative Powers Act of 2000
The U.K.'s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIP Act)
makes it a criminal offense to intentionally intercept, without authorization,
"any communication in the course of its transmission."35 2 The RIP Act
makes it a criminal offense to intercept communications from any "public
postal service" or "a public telecommunication system." '353 An interception
is defined as any modification, interference or monitoring of electronic
communications. 4  The RIP Act is inapplicable to private telecom-
munications systems such as intranets or Virtual Private Networks.355 The
U.K. statute contemplates public enforcement by the police, but there is no
express provision for private enforcement by plaintiffs such as employees
whose data has been intercepted.356
The RIP Act does not address the workplace scenario specifically, but
permits employers in general to intercept e-mail or monitor Internet access
so long as both senders and recipients consent. If law enforcement obtains
a lawful warrant, the interception may be permitted under U.K.
Telecommunications Regulations. 57 U.K. employers may intercept e-mail
or Internet communications only if the monitoring is conducted to carry out
350. NICK HIGHAM & SARA ELGSTRAND, DATA PROTECTION OVERVIEW (2001).
351. See, e.g., McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4103 (Tex. App. 1999).
352. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, § l(l) (Eng.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023a.htm (last visited May 22, 2005).
353. Id. at § l(1)(a), (b).
354. Id. at § 2.
355. Id. at § 6 (noting the exclusion for "an interception of a communication in the
course of its transmission by means of a private telecommunication system").
356. Id. at § 7(a), (b) (describing fines and imprisonment of terms not exceeding two
years for unlawful interceptions).
357. Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2699, The Telecommunications (Lawful Business
Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000, available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002699.htm (last visited May 22, 2005).
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the employer's business activities. It would not be a business objective for
a U.K. executive to intercept e-mail to learn more about the personal lives
of employees. The RIP Act was enacted to ensure that interception of
electronic communications was appropriately balanced with basic human
rights,358 which confirms the evolution of privacy as a fundamental human
right. While no case law has yet construed the RIP Act, it is quite likely
that workers will find limited protection under the statute.
c. The Lawful Business Practice Regulations
The United Kingdom's Lawful Business Practice Regulations (LBPR)
govern the rights and responsibilities of businesses that monitor electronic
communications.35 9 The LBPR provide exceptions to the RIP Act, stating
that conditions for monitoring without employees' consent. Companies
may monitor and keep records of Internet communications to comply with
regulatory or self-regulatory practices and procedures.3 60 The monitoring
of company employees must be limited to their use of the company's
computer system within the scope of their duties.36'
The LBRP authorizes interception without employees' express
consent in five circumstances: (1) to establish the existence of facts, to
ascertain compliance with regulatory or self-regulatory practices or
procedures (quality control and training); (2) to prevent or detect crimes;
(3) to investigate or detect unauthorized use of telecommunication systems;
(4) to secure, or as an inherent part of, an effective system operation; and
(5) to determine whether or not the communications are business
communications.36 2
358. THE RECORD MANAGEMENT SECTION, DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY PRACTICE
(2001), available at http://www.recordsmanagement.ed.ac.uk/InfoStaff/masons-newsletters/
issue5.pdf.
359. Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2699, The Telecommunications (Lawful Business
Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000, available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002699.htm (last visited May 22, 2005).
360. Id. at § 3(a)(i)(aa), (bb). An employer must not only comply with LBPR but also
the Telecommunications Regulation of 1999 implementing the Data Protection Directive
(97/66/EC, also refereed to as the ISDN Directive) about processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector. The Telecom Directive, which
updates definitions for telecommunications services and networks with new definitions for
electronic communications and services to ensure technological neutrality and update the
law to encompass e-mail and use of the Internet. The Telecomm Data Directive requires the
U.K. and all other Member States to protect "the confidentiality of communications made
by means of public telecomm systems and specifically prohibits activities such as recording
or tapping by others than users." Dept. of Trade & Indus., Unlawful Business Practices,
Response to Consultation, at http://www.dti.gov.uk/ industries/ecommunicationslawful_
businesspractice.regulationsresponseto consultation.html (last visited May 22, 2005).
361. Id. at § 3(a)(i)(cc).
362. LBPR broadly addresses any lawful interceptions of communication and does not
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However, interception is only authorized if the controller of the
telecommunication system (or the employer) has made all reasonable
efforts to inform potential users that the interception may take place.
3 63
Failure to comply with this requirement can render the use of the
intercepted personal data unlawful. LBPR is only focused on business
communications, which means that it does not permit employers to monitor
personal communications. 364  The British approach creates a line of
demarcation between e-mail that is personal or private from business and
private communications.3 65  If there is a reasonable suspicion that an
employee is violating a corporate e-mail policy, the employer must be
prepared to present evidence that led to further investigation.366
d. The Importance of a Clear Policy
According to the RIP Act, LBPR and DPA, only communications "in
the course of transmission" may be lawfully intercepted. This might give
rise to problems when it comes to stored records of private e-mails and
Internet usage. To avoid this legal exposure, companies need a clearly
delineated Internet or e-mail usage policy. In addition, the employer
should require the employees to agree to the terms, since "the regulations
expressly do not affect monitoring to which employees have given their
consent. '3 67 A Code of Practice for both e-mail and Internet usage is the
most efficient measure of ensuring the privacy and rights of the employees
and protecting the employer from any potential liabilities.
D. The French Approach to E-Surveillance
The French government is concerned about how the
commercialization of private information threatens the right to privacy,
legislation, and fundamental freedoms, not only for individuals but also for
society and democracy as a whole.3 68 The French government has been
specifically address the monitoring of traffic data, storage, or use of personal information
obtained as a result of interception. See supra note 359.
363. id. at 26.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 8.
367. See E-mail and Internet Monitoring: A Snooper's Charter?, WORKING BRIEF
(Henmans Newsletter Oxford, U.K.), Dec. 2000, at http://www.henmans.co.uk/emp-nwo8.
html (2004).
368. Guy Braibant, Donnies Personnelles et Socigtd de L'information, RAPPORT AU
PREMIER MINISTRE SUR LA TRANSPOSITION EN DROIT FRANQAIS DE LA DIRECTIVE 95/46 (Mar.
3, 1998), available at http://www.forumIntemet.org/documents/rapports-avis/
lire.phtml?id=67.
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reticent in legitimating information-gathering regarding physical persons in
its attempt to protect 175 citizens from privacy abuses associated with new
technologies. In January 1978, the French government instituted "La
Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Liberis" (National
Commission for Information Technology and Civil liberties) (CNIL), 369 an
independent administrative authority.37° CNIL's main purposes are to
protect la vie privie (the right to a private life), to propose legislation, and
to inform and educate the French people about their rights regarding all
aspects of electronic communication.3
The CNIL has a close relationship with another legal institution, "Le
Forum des droits sur l'Internet" (FDI), which translates as the forum of the
rights on the Internet, and is supported by the French government and
private entities.372 This collaborative institution functions like an incubator
for the various issues that can arise in the virtual world-for example, the
relationship between work and the Internet.373 CNIL recognizes that there
is an expectation among employees to be able to use the Internet at work
for personal use, just as they were able to use the phone and minite374 for
personal conversations before.
The FDI concludes that this is a reasonable trade off, because the
employer benefits from having his employees connected and available via
the Internet at all times.375 In some cases this means that the employer has
the ability to reach the employees at all times through portable computers
and cell phones; therefore, the FDI contends that it is only fair for
employees be able to use these electronic devices for some personal use as
well.
37 6
369. Through the law n' 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative A l'informatique, aux fichiers
et aux libert6s (the law about information technology).
370. This means that it does not obtain instructions from any other authority and is
financed by the state.
371. See CNIL R6publique Franqaise, L'institution, at http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?
id=16 (last modified Apr. 8, 2005).
372. Le Forum des droits sur l'Internet, Ministire djlegug a la Recherche et aux
Nouvelles Technologies, at http://www.droitdunet.fr/apropos/partenaires.phtml (last visited
May 25, 2005).
373. Le Forum des Droits sur l'Intemet, Groupe de Travail Relation du Travail et
Internet (Aug. 8, 2001), at http://www.forumlnternet.org/groupes-travaillire.phtml?id=43.
374. Minitel is a monochrome teletext system founded in 1981 and launched in 1983 by
France Telecom in France. The publicly available network system made sharing
information with electronic communication more efficient. James Arnold, France's
Minitel: 20 years young, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3012769.stm (last updated
May 14, 2005).
375. Le Forum des Droits sur L'Internet, Relations du Travail et Internet (Sept. 17,
2002), at 14 & 16, available at http://www.forumlnternet.org/telechargement/documents/
rapp-RTI-20020917.htm.
376. Id. at 12.
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1. French Legislation on Internet Monitoring
As with other European countries, in France, Article 8 of the ECHR
77
and Article 9 in the Civil Code3 78 regulate the right to a private life. Article
9 states that "everyone has a right to a private life, which allows a judge to
take all measures possible to prevent any attempts to threaten the intimacy
of the right to a private life. 3 79 The definition of a private life is not clearly
established; it is decided on a case by case basis.3 80 However, some of the
basic elements of private life include secrets, sexuality, health, family,
feelings and friends.381 These are aspects of life that French society wants
to protect against third-party spying and prying.382
An employer's right to monitor and to interfere with an employee's
personal affairs is prohibited under the Employment Code unless the
interference is in accordance with the purpose and in proportion to the
reason of the interference.383 However, a French employer is not allowed
to collect any information of a personal character unless he has clearly
informed his employees about it, and the information about the monitoring
is easily available.384 If the employer does not comply with the notice
requirement, he can get punished with up to three years of prison and
45,000 • in fines for knowingly intercepting personal electronic
communications or even for having devices in the system that can
385intercept. In America, monitoring without notice is not a criminal act;
rather, the employer is permitted to monitor the communication systems
even without any notification since the systems are the property of the
employer.
A French employer is permitted to control employees' electronic
377. See supra Part B.2.
378. Code civil [C. cIv.] art. 9 (Fr.).
379. Id.
380. Guy Braibant, Donn~es personnelles et socijtj de l'infonrmation, RAPPORT AU
PREMIER MINISTRE SUR LA TRANSPOSITION EN DROIT FRANI;AIS DE LA DIRECTIVE 95/46 (Mar.
3, 1998), at 6, available at
http://www.forumlnternet.org/documents/rapports-avis/lire.
phtml?id=67.
381. Id. at 7-8.
382. Information can have both private and public character, depending on what the
intention was when the information was given. Private information can be given a public
character by voluntary acts: for example, addresses and phone numbers given to a phone
company in order to be listed in a phonebook. Also, acts made in public or professional
places maintain private information: for example, one eats and drinks in public and
professional places, disclosing what it is that he is consuming, but that information will still
maintain a private character. Id.
383. Code du travail [C. TRAV.] arts. L.120-2 & L.422-1-1 (Fr.).
384. Code du travail [C. TRAY.] arts. L.121-8, R. 122-12 & L. 412-8 (Fr.).
385. Code penal [C. PEN.] art. 226-15 (Fr.).
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communications but must protect their right to privacy.386  The FDI
recognizes that an absolute ban of private messages would be
unenforceable for employees who occasionally use the Internet for personal
use.3 87  Further, if the employer restricts private use of electronic
communications, then that restriction has to be proportional and reasonably
calculated to protect the company.38 8  No employer could prohibit all
personal use of the corporate network, because no French court would ever
view an absolute ban as a proportional measure.38 9
A network administrator can implant a surveillance system to protect
against abuse, but he is only allowed to analyze web traffic or patterns of
web addresses.3 90 An administrator should be able to monitor whether
employees are visiting pornographic web sites, or if they are transmitting
other objectionable content.391  An employer's computer system
administrators may monitor general traffic, but they are not permitted to
read or monitor specific messages. A systems administrator can control
web traffic flow or conduct systems maintenance without prying into the
specific content of messages, which would violate privacy. An
administrator who crosses the line of reading specific messages may be
sanctioned by fines and imprisonment.3 92
2. Online Privacy Cases
French courts have clearly articulated employees' right to online
privacy in the workplace. In Societe Nikon France v. M. Onof,393 the court
held that an employer had no legal right to intercept and read personal e-
mails, even if the employer supplied the computer and expressly provided
that employees were not to use their computers for personal e-mail or
386. Le Forum des droits sur l'Internet, Relations du travail et Internet (Sept. 17, 2002),
at 19, available at http://www.foruminternet.org/telechargement/documents/rapp-RTI-
20020917.htm.
387. Id. at 17.
388. Code du travail [C. TRAY.] art. L.122-43 (Fr.).
389. Id. at 17.
390. Id. at 19.
391. The employer has no right to disturb the private life and the individual freedoms of
employees, or impose restrictions that are not justified as loyal, transparent and
proportional. Code du travail [C. TRAV.] art. L. 120-2 (Fr.). Relations du travail et Internet,
supra note 375.
392. Code p6nal [C. PEN.] arts. 226-15 & 432-9 (Fr.); ECHR, supra note 209 (noting
that the right to keep private correspondence secret has been recognized in France since
1938 (Mas et association de la critique dramatique v. de Rovera et Signorino, Cour d'Appel
de Paris, 17 June 1938)).
393. Cour de Cassation [Cass. soc.], Chambre social, Oct. 2, 2001. (Cour de Cassation is
the Supreme Court of France).
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Internet uses.394 The Societe Nikon court validated the employee's zone of
privacy, finding it permissible to use the Internet for personal use during
work time.395 The court also said that the employer had no right to
intercept files clearly marked as personal files.396 The Societe Nikon court
held that employers have no general right to monitor e-mail or Internet
communications unless the employer has complied with the notice
requirement.397 In addition, it must be proven that the employee has actual
knowledge of the employer's monitoring activities.398
A decision by the Cour d'Appel de Montpellier399 held that the
employer has the burden of proof in demonstrating that employees have
been expressly informed about the surveillance of electronic
communications. The court held that the employer did not comply with the
notice requirement by notifying employees that Internet monitoring could
be possible sometime in the future when seventeen installed 175 Internet
systems in 1996.400
Even if the French courts are solicitous of the private lives of
employees, they have upheld the termination of employees who misused of
computers at work by using them as instrumentalities for crime. The court
in Marc P. v. Spot Image4°' confirmed that the employer acted properly
when it dismissed the plaintiff from work after the discovery that he had
transmitted anti-Semitic e-mails from his workplace computer. The court
stated that when it comes to illegal e-mail or content that is objectionable,
employees have no right to offensive or criminal messages.402  An
employer transmitting illegal or objectionable e-mails is acting outside the
scope of his employment and is contrary to professional norms.4 3
In France, the FDI gives guidelines on how an employer can ensure
394. France established very early that employees have the right to privacy when
corresponding at work, which was the outcome of Mas et association de la critique
dramatique v. de Rovera et Signorino, Dalloz Hebdomadaire, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 17
June 1938, p. 520.
395. When deciding this case the court looked at Article 8 of ECHR, Code civil [C. civ.]
art. 9 (Fr.) and Code du travail [C. TRAV.] art. L.120-2. (Fr.). Id.
396. See F. M., H. H. et V. R. v. Ministre public et A. T., Cour d'Appel de Paris, 17
Dec. 2001 (holding that private electronical communication is protected by Art. 432-9 in the
Criminal code as "correspondence").
397. Id.
398. The actual knowledge requirement was also developed in two cases regarding video
surveillance, M. Alaimo v. Societe Italexpress Transports Groupe Frans Maas, Cour de
Cassation, Chambre social, 31 Jan. 2001; see also Societe Transports Frigorifiques
Europeens v. M. Smari, Cour de Cassation, Chambre social, 15 May 2001.
399. SCP Lefevre et Broussous v. Monsieur P.K., Cour d'Appel de Montpellier,
Chambre sociale, 6 June 2001.
400. Id.
401. Courde Cassation, Chambre social [Cass. soc.], June 2 2004.
402. Id.
403. Code du travail [C. TRAV.] art. L. 120-4 (Fr.). Id. at 3.
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that it is violating an employee's right of privacy. First, employees should
indicate whether the communication is private or business related; if it is
not indicated, there should be a presumption that the message is business-
related.4° If the message, in fact, is private, then the administration has a
duty to label it private.0 5 The FDI does not support encrypted messages,
since there is a great risk that the message will be classified as a virus and
be quarantined.40 6 Second, the firm should have some kind of Intemet
policy where employees are warned about the need to exercise good faith
when they execute their work407 or in the labeling of messages and files.
408
The policy should be in written form with clear and conspicuous terms and
conditions. The employer must also give employees notice about their e-
mail and Internet policy 40 9 because it is illegal for the employer to monitor
the system without having first informed the employees. An employer's
failure to comply with the notification procedures may be used as evidence
against the employer in a subsequent proceeding.
4 0 Third, the employer
may protect its computer system by filtering out objectionable websites or
blocking the downloading of large files.4 i1
Further, the FDI requires that the administrator of personal data has a
duty to ensure the security and the confidentiality of information. The
company's e-mail and Internet policy should warrant that an individual's
confidentiality will be protected.41 2  The European Commission has
adopted a similar approach for its new directive on employment-specific
rules on data protection at the workplace. This is also an important first
step in order to maintain the privacy of employees where employers have a
legitimate reason to monitor e-mails and Internet usage.
IV. REFORMING E-MAIL AND INTERNET USAGE
A. Two Different Paradigms for Workplace Privacy
American and European employers have diametrically opposed
approaches to workplace privacy, as can be seen through the lens of the
PhDog.com hypothetical. Part I documented the U.S. "property-rights"
approach to online workplace privacy versus the European human rights
approach discussed in Part II. The two different paradigms for online
404. Id. at 18.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Code du travail [C. TRAY.] art. L. 120-4 (Fr.).
408. Id. at21.
409. Id.
410. Code du travail [C. TRAV.] art. L. 121-8 (Fr.).
411. Id. at 19.
412. Id. at 20.
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workplace privacy can be largely explained by the U.S. emphasis on
market-driven solutions or "savoir faire," as opposed to the greater
emphasis on human rights throughout Europe.
As we have learned from our hypothetical, employers in the United
States enjoy a "duty-free" zone when it comes to electronic spying in the
workplace. American employers have what is in effect an absolute
immunity from constitutional, common law, and federal statutory remedies
for abusive surveillance practices, with few exceptions. A multinational
corporation such as PhDog.com would need to audit its surveillance
practice before implementing it in Europe, where the employer's ability to
monitor e-mail is balanced against the employees' right to privacy. In
Europe, e-mails are regarded as private communications and are accorded
the same protection as phone calls whereas American courts use the
private/public distinction to divest workers of any expectation of privacy.4 13
America has yet to develop meaningful common law or statutory remedies,
even when electronic surveillance is implemented in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner.
In general, the United States is more standard-oriented than the rule-
specific regimes implemented in Europe. Every European country (with
the exception of the United Kingdom) follows civil law systems that
evolved out of Roman law. The predominant effect of civil codes is to
forge bright-line protections, as opposed to fuzzy precedents. The civil law
regimes of Europe vary substantially from country to country, but it is fair
to say that the approach is more rule-oriented than in the United States.
The civil code countries protect their workers using bright-line rules that
prescribe what specific steps must be taken to implement electronic
monitoring of workers.
In America, it has been clear that whatever is in your work computer
belongs to your employer. If the employer has an e-mail and Internet policy
forbidding all personal use, he can inspect any files on the computer with
414impunity. A recent article defended these practices, contending that
current U.S. law is consistent and "fair given the nature and purpose of the
workplace. 4 5 We disagree. Electronic surveillance practices in the U.S.
413. See, e.g., Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); see also Vernars v. Young, 539
F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976).
414. See McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS
4103 (Tex. App. 1999); see also Albert J. Muick v. Glenayre Electrics, 280 F.3d 741 (7th
Cir. 2002) (describing events in which laptop used by plaintiff in the course of his
employment was seized by his former employer who handed it over to the federal
authorities in response to a search warrant. The court held that no privacy right was violated
since the company's policy gave them the right to inspect the laptop at any time).
415. Christopher Pearson Fazekas, 1984 Is Still Fiction: Electronic Monitoring In The
Workplace And U.S. Privacy Law, 2004 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 15 (2004), at
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/2004dltrOOI5.html (last visited May 25,
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workplace infringe on the fundamental privacy rights of workers and
constitute the functional equivalent of a digital leash.
No current technology gives employers the software to distinguish
between an employee's personal communications and her business
communications. Under current U.S. law, business as well as private
communications are deemed to be the personal property of employers.
Further, we contend that there is a need for a more balanced approach in
the United States. We propose an Electronic Monitoring Act of 2005
which would give all U.S. employees actual notice (written and electronic)
and require their express and informed consent before any monitoring
program can be implemented. The American approach to telephone calls
recognizes a distinction between personal and business use, and that same
logic should be extended to e-mail.
1. Market-Driven America vs. Human Rights-Oriented Europe
American employers are not hamstrung by the requirement that an
employer formulate clear e-mail and Internet guidelines, inform their
employees, and obtain express consent before monitoring. Throughout
Europe, workers enjoy greater procedural rights protecting their basic
rights to privacy in the workplace. European employers, for example, are
required to give employees clear and conspicuous notice about e-mail
surveillance. If actual notice of surveillance is not established, any
interception of electronic communications is considered to be unlawful. In
contrast, the U.S. permits employers to monitor electronic communications
even if they do not have a clear policy or have not informed the employees
about the surveillance. Even if a European employer restricts Internet
usage and totally prohibits personal use of business computers, they are not
permitted to indiscriminately read all messages and files. Courts
throughout Europe require that electronic surveillance be supported by a
specific "employer need to know" basis. In other words, electronic
monitoring must be reasonably based, proportional, transparent and non-
discriminatory.4 16  If an employer fails to comply with the specific
requirements, it is exposed to civil as well as criminal liability, unless the
firm can demonstrate that an exception applies. This is contrary to the
rights of an American employer, where courts have validated employers'
monitoring of electronic communications even if the company has
expressly promised not to monitor messages and has not formulated a
2005).
416. Gilbert Demez, La preuve en droit du travail: protection de la vie privee et
nouvelles technologies, in Question de droit social, Formation permanente CUP series, No.
56 (2002).
898 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:4
specific policy.
41 7
B. Towards a New Kind of Workplace
Even if the presumption is that all use of computers is for work,
European courts acknowledge that employees may have private files and
messages on their work computers, so long as they are clearly delineated.
In contrast, U.S. courts have formulated the legal fiction that there is no
such thing as a private file on an employee's office computer. In America
there has been one decision where a court held that the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal AOL e-mail account,
even if access was from a work computer.4 8 However, the majority of
courts follow U.S. v. Charbonneau,4 9 which found no expectation of
privacy in a personal e-mail account. In that case, the defendant was
convicted of possessing child pornography based on images found on the
defendant's office computer. Similarly, the First Circuit in United States v.
Councilman420 held that, irrespective of the nature of e-mails, a plaintiff had
no standing to argue that the federal Wiretap Act applies, because e-mail is
considered to be in storage when intercepted.421
In this era of information technology, where the fixed workplace is
being rapidly displaced by a more protean electronic environment, wireless
network connections create a seamless workplace.4 22 In a telecommuting
world, an employee's workplace may be anywhere and everywhere. This
evolution gives employees more freedom, more time with their families,
and decreases the traffic on our roads. Technology also benefits
employers, who are able to communicate with their employees at all times.
In order to ensure some privacy for an American employee working in a
cross-border workplace, he would have to have two computers, one for
private files and one for business; but this is often impractical.
Some commentators believe that the current U.S. legal regime of no
privacy in the electronic workplace is appropriate because the federal
417. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
418. U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that when the FBI searched
through the work computer of the plaintiff, a military officer, the massages sent to another
AOL subscriber were private).
419. 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
420. 373 F.3d 197, 209 (1st Cir. 2004) (reasoning that Congress intended to exclude
stored communications from the scope of the Wiretap Act).
421. In October of 2004, the First Circuit withdrew its opinion in Councilman and
granted a rehearing en banc. United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004).
422. Eight percent of employees in the U.K. had a portable computer through work in
2001, which were at that time the best equipped employees in Europe. Le Forum desdroits
sur l'Internet, Relations du travail et Internet (Sept. 17, 2002), at 8, available at
http:/lwww.foruminternet.org/telechargement/documents/rapp-RTI_20020917.htm.
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government does not provide specific protections.
423  This formalistic
approach to workplace privacy rights is based upon the simple premise that
employees foreclose their privacy rights when using their employer's
computer network.424
Workers relinquish their right to privacy in the workplace whereas
they enjoy heightened protection of privacy in their private residence.
5
But the rise of telecommuting has obscured the sharp divide between the
private home and the workplace. If employers monitor computer usage in
the home on an employer-issued computer, the employer will no longer
have a zone of privacy in his residence. The European approach to
electronic monitoring is to recognize a zone of privacy that applies in the
workplace as well as the home. Under the European privacy-based regime,
workers never waive their privacy rights, whether they are working from
home or at the office. A more humanistic legal environment must
recognize a zone of privacy but also validate the right to monitor where
there is a demonstrated need.
C. Towards a Harmonized Safe Harbor for Electronic Monitoring
"The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.
426
Much ink has been spilled about the consequences of computer
technologies in eroding privacy. Much of the commentary has been critical
of the U.S. approach, which refuses to balance employee privacy against
the employer's need to monitor. In the case of the electronic workplace,
there is lag between legal norms and technology.
427
423. Fazekas, supra note 415.
424. See Smyth v. Pilsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996); McLaren 
v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103 (Tex. App. 1999).
425. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994) (remarking "[f]or
the right to privacy to mean anything, it must guarantee privacy to an individual 
in his own
home" and held that the officer was not allowed to record a conversation in Brion's home
even if he had consented, because there was no probable cause); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation 
of
privacy from being secretly photographed and recorded by reporters that he had invited into
his home office).
426. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. II, 6 (1690). John Locke
(1632-1704) lived in England and his books Two Treaties on Government argue that man is
born free in nature; because man is free and rational entity, he has a contract with the state
in which he does not give up his inalienable rights of life, liberty and property. Should an
oppressive government challenge those rights, then man should rebel.
427. See generally Eltis, supra note 18, at 487 (2003) (arguing that it is incumbent to
harmonize the law as to e-mail eavesdropping in the global economy).
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Briefly stated, we propose The Electronic Monitoring Act of 2005, a
provision that shares common ground with a proposed federal statute
introduced in the 106th Congress that languished in committee.428 Our
proposed federal statute would go beyond notice in providing meaningful
remedies against the misuse or abuse of electronic surveillance. Our
proposal act would require all U.S. employers to provide electronic notice
of electronic surveillance to all employees and prospective employees.
Employees must be advised electronically that monitoring of e-mail or
Internet usage has been implemented each time they access their
employer's computer system. In addition, all employers would be required
to give specific written notice to employees prior to instituting a
monitoring program. Employers who instituted clandestine monitoring
programs would be deemed to be in violation of the federal statute.
Finally, all employers implementing a monitoring program would be
required to articulate legitimate business reasons for instituting a
monitoring program, which may include protecting intellectual property
assets, reducing online torts, or other employment-related reasons.
Employers instituting monitoring outside a "need to know" basis would be
subject to criminal as well as civil penalties, including compensatory as
well as punitive damages. Prevailing employees may also receive
reimbursement for attorneys' fees and costs in the proper case. This simple
right to notice and the formulation of meaningful remedies against abuses
would essentially eliminate oppressive monitoring enabled by a legal
environment of absolute immunity for electronic surveillance.
In the long run, our proposed federal legislation would make U.S.
companies such as PhDog.com more competitive in their trade with
Europe. The statute would, in effect, lower the cost of harmonizing U.S.
practices with the European law of electronic monitoring. In an
interconnected world where the personal data of workers crosses
international borders, it is critical that European and U.S. electronic
surveillance practices be more uniform. Any business transmitting data
from any of the member states of the E.U. must already conform to each
country's implementation of the Data Protection Directive. Consent must
be obtained from the data subject prior to entering in to the contract, and
this consent is vital for any processing of personal data,429 contrary to the
viewpoint of American courts where there is no need for explicit consent
before processing of personal data obtained through monitoring.
Member states of the E.U. are required to provide that a transfer of
personal data to other countries takes places only if there is assurance of an
428. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000).
429. Id. at Art. 7.
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"adequate level of [data] protection."4 30  All organizations are prohibited
from transferring the personal information of Europeans unless the
transferee complies with the Directive's notice and choice principles.
431 If
a European company does not respect these principles, the company can be
civilly liable for the unlawful processing of personal data.
432 Damages may
be assessed for collecting or transmitting information without data subject
consent,433 which would not be the case in America where there is more or
less no expectation of privacy. At present, any company such as
PhDog.com transferring personally identifiable information of European
workers would be in violation of the Data Protection Directive,
4 34 and the
company would have to pay damages.
U.S. companies need to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between their
business need to monitor electronic communications and the privacy rights
of workers. Creating informational privacy rights for American workers is
critical to the future of cross-border sales and services. The shrinking of
national boundaries in our global economy creates new legal dilemmas for
companies that violate European legal norms. Amazon.com, for example,
has been investigated in Europe for violating data protection laws in the
collection of personal data on visitors.
435  It follows that other U.S.
430. Id. at Art. 17 (in general) and Art. 25 (for other countries outside the E.U.). The six
legal grounds defined in the Directive are "consent, contract, legal obligation, vital interest
of the data subject or the balance between the legitimate interests of the people controlling
the data and the people on whom data is held (i.e. data subjects)." European Commission
Press Release: IP/95/822, Council Definitively Adopts Directive on Protection of Personal
Data (July 25, 1995), at http://www.privacy.org/pi/intl-orgs/ec/dp-EC-press_ release.txt
(last visited May 4, 2005).
431. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), available
at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shprinciplesfinal.htm. The European Commission
approved new standard contractual clauses which business can use to ensure adequate
safeguards when data is transferred from the E.U. to a non-E.U. country in Commission
Decision C (2004)5271 from Jan. 7, 2005. Europa, Data Protection: Commission Approves
New Standard Clauses for Data Transfers to Non-EU Countries (Jan. 7, 2005), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=IP/05/12&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DATA PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/privacy/
modelcontracts en.htm (last visited May 25, 2005).
432. See id. (providing "adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy
and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals").
433. Id.
434. Ann Cavoukian, The State of Privacy and Data Protection in Canada, the European
Union, Japan and Australia, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, June 2003, available at http://www.ipc.on.ca/
userfiles/page..attachments/state-pi.pdf (last visited May 25, 2005); PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW (4TH ANNUAL): PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT IN A
SECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD (2003), available at WESTLAW, TP-ALL.
435. See Kathleen Fay, Amazon.com Worldwide Operations Under Fire for Revising
Privacy Policy, 17 No. 8 E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY 7 (Dec. 2000) (reporting that the
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companies will be at a competitive disadvantage in Europe if they
implement electronic surveillance without regard to the fundamental rights
of employees.
In the late 1990s, the United States Commerce Department negotiated
a "safe harbor" with the E.U. for the transfer of personal data by agreeing
to adhere to reasonable precautions protecting data integrity.4 36 Just as the
U.S. and Europe negotiated a safe harbor for the transfer of personal data,
we propose a safe harbor for privacy practices and e-mail or Internet
monitoring that appropriately balances the right of employers to monitor
electronic communications with fundamental human rights. The Electronic
Monitoring Act of 2005 would serve as an important source of law in
forging a safe harbor.
The proposed Electronic Monitoring Act of 2005 would help to
correct the U.S.'s image as a country that devalues privacy in the
workplace. The U.S. is widely perceived to be an insecure environment for
the handling of personal data, and our business community has been placed
at a competitive disadvantage because of our lackadaisical practices.437
Few sectors of the U.S. economy have adhered to even minimal data
protection principles, and the fear has been that data could no longer be
transferred securely to the United States.438 The blockage of data flow to
the U.S. would be catastrophic and would endanger the global information
economy.439
V. CONCLUSION
Gatsby believed in the green light, the organistic future that year
by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that's no
United Kingdom is being asked to enjoin Amazon.com's U.K. affiliate from violating the
UK's data protection act).
436. The United States is lobbying international organizations to convince them to adopt
America's self-regulatory approach to privacy. The United States is participating in the
Platform for Privacy Protection (P3P), which is an industry standard developed by the
World Wide Web Consortium that will enable visitors to express privacy preferences
through their browsers. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. GOVERNMENT WORKING GROUP ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 40 (2000). U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/
shprinciplesfinal.htm.
437. The European and the United States Commerce Department arrived at an agreement
so that data could be transferred between American and European companies. See EU
States Endorse Negotiations with United States on Data Privacy, 67 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
2252 (Nov. 3, 1998).
438. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S.-European Union Talks on Privacy Are Sputtering, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1999, at C6.
439. The Europeans were generally satisfied with privacy protection for the personal
information of medical patients.
2005] MONITORING EMPLOYEE E-MAIL & INTERNET USAGE 903
matter-tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms
farther.... And then one fine morning-So we beat on, boats
against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.
40
The World Wide Web became part of the American dream in the early
1990s. It is now impossible to imagine a workplace without bandwidth,
browsers, and bytes. Today workers are accessing the Internet through
their cell phones, pagers, personal digital assistants and business
computers. More specifically, cyberspace is increasingly part of the
modern workplace because it is the place where companies host web sites,
fill orders, render professional services, and communicate electronically
with subsidiaries around the globe. Companies have increased their
productivity and efficiency thanks to information technology, but abuse of
the Internet has led companies to monitor electronic communications to
protect their rights and limit their liabilities. The U.S. property-based
approach to electronic monitoring has left American workers without
meaningful remedies for intrusive e-spying.
Would Dr. Eckleberg's gaze today symbolize spyware used in the
twenty-first century electronic workplace? 441 Would the omniscient eyes
peering out from giant yellow eyeglasses view every worker's keystroke,
harvest every website visited, and monitor the contents of every computer
screen? Today Dr. Eckleberg's all-encompassing eye would be replaced by
an electronic gaze that treats every employee in the workplace as an object
to be monitored. In a world of malevolent hackers, negligent employees
and widespread corporate espionage, it is imperative that companies protect
their information assets. The failure to monitor employees' e-mail or
Internet usage will expose a business to catastrophic losses due to
reputational, legal, and business risks stemming from the compromise of
trade secrets, business plans, and other proprietary information.
The long-term impact of our modest law reform would be to make the
U.S. more competitive in a global economy by harmonizing workplace
monitoring law with the privacy regimes of our European trading partners.
Even for U.S. companies that do not do business in Europe, the proposed
statute appropriately balances the employer's need to monitor against the
employee's right to a zone of privacy when it comes to sensitive health
information, personal finances, intimate relationships, or other private
information unrelated to the workplace.
442
440. FITZGERALD, supra note 7, at ch. 9.
441. See generally Eric P. Robinson, Big Brother or Modem Management: E-mail
Monitoring in the Private Workplace, 17 LAB. LAW 311 (2001).
442. Brian S. Conneely & Jonathon D. Farrell, Can Employers Monitor And Read
Employee E-mails, LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS, Aug. 2, 2002, available at
http://www.rivkinradler.com/rivkinradler/Publications/newformat/
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We, just as Mr. Gatsby, believe in the green light, the dream of the
technical revolution, and have faith in the Internet and electronic
communications. However, the American law of privacy "stands apart
from most of the world which starts instead from the position that the right
to privacy is a central tenet of human dignity."443 Whereas the American
property-rights approach leaves employees without constitutional, common
law or statutory remedies, the right of European employers to monitor
electronic communications is balanced against employees' informational
privacy rights. It is clear that there needs to be some balance in order to
keep the dream of the technological revolution and the Internet alive and
not turn it into a hollow and empty shell.
The path of online electronic surveillance law should strive to balance
the employers' need to know with the right of employees to maintain a
zone of privacy. Arming employees with limited procedural rights will
lead to employees' greater productivity, because they will have a zone of
privacy. This modest reform would prevent the rage against the machine of
the past from repeating itself in the age of information.
To respect a reasonable expectation of privacy in employees'
electronic communications in the workplace will humanize the workplace
while also protecting the employer. Our limited reform, granting workers
notice and remedies for employer abuses in electronic surveillance, is only
the first step in developing a labor law that truly respects the dignity of the
person. Gone should be the days when American employers could secretly
intercept their employees' e-mail and Internet usage.
200208conneelyfarrell.shtml
443. Lasprogata et al., supra note 15, at T 8.
